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PSYCHIATRIC INJURY IN AVIATION ACCIDENTS UNDER
THE WARSAW AND MONTREAL CONVENTIONS: THE




T HIS ARTICLE EXAMINES the handling of psychiatric in-
Ijury under the framework of the Convention for the Unifi-
cation of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air, or Warsaw Convention of 1929,' and the Montreal Con-
vention of 1999,2 a "consolidating and modernizing" conven-
tion, which both govern injury to passengers in international air
travel.3 The Warsaw and Montreal Conventions establish liabil-
ity for passenger injury, which has been interpreted as being
strictly physical injury.4 Under the Warsaw Convention, recov-
ery for pure psychological injury has been excluded.5 The ori-
gin of this exclusion derives from the interpretation of the
convention's term lesion corporelle, which in its English transla-
* Christopher J. Andrews, B.E., M.B.B.S., M.Eng.Sc., J.D., Ph.D., Dip.C.Sc.,
EDIC, GDLP, FACLM. Barrister at Law, Private Bar, Queensland, Australia.
** Vernon Nase, B.A. (Qid), M.A. (Syd), Grad. Dip. Lib. (NSW), Dip. Ed.
(STC), LL.B (Hons) (Lond), Ph.D. (Qid), Associate Professor, School of Law,
City University of Hong Kong, Adjunct Professor, Murdoch University.
I Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention] (entered into force on Oct. 29,
1934).
2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, opened for signature May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 2242 U.N.T.S.
309 [hereinafter Montreal Convention of 1999] (entered into force on Nov. 4,
2003). As of Mar. 15, 2011, there are 97 States Parties, including the European
Union States and the United States. Description of Status of the Montreal Con-
vention, ICAO, http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/mtl99.pdf).
3 Id.
4 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991).
5 Id. at 544.
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tion requires strictly physical injury to a passenger.6 The origin
and precedents for the exclusion are examined. It is found that
the strict interpretation derives from the desire to interpret the
Warsaw Convention in terms applicable to the 1929 understand-
ing of psychiatric injury. It is further noted that this also may
not be appropriate under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties 1969.
While the interpretation has almost universally required phys-
ical injury, there has been a minor (but disputed) widening of
scope of liability in recent years, contemplated in both Weaver v.
Delta Airlines, Inc.7 and King v. Bristow Helicopters Ltd.,' to allow
injury manifesting psychologically when it can be shown that it
derives directly from physical changes in the body, even where
not palpably obvious. Attention is drawn, however, to a certain
disturbing looseness in expression and understanding of the dif-
ferences between symptoms, signs, diagnoses and pathologies.
Contemporary medical understandings of psychiatric injury are
presented and draw a distinction between these facets.
Against this background, it is suggested, firstly, that the dis-
tinction between physical and mental illness is artificial in any
case, and, secondly, that physical changes in psychiatric illness
are well based and becoming increasingly understood. Indeed,
the demonstration of such change is limited only by our exami-
nation and investigation techniques. Examples are given in de-
pression and mood disorder, post traumatic stress disorder, and
psychotic illness. A medical understanding also takes account of
environmental factors in disease and the clear influence of the
physical on the mental. It is thus argued that even if one accepts
the necessity for physicality to injury, evidence abounds to place
mental injury in the same framework.
It is further argued that there is justification for accepting
mental injury per se, as to do so clarifies and unifies several oth-
erwise conflicting areas of the law, unifies the law of aviation
with other areas of transportation, and indeed gives acknowl-
edgement to a human rights issue.
Acknowledgement is given to concerns regarding the accept-
ance of mental injury, including the "floodgates" argument, dif-
ficulties involved in diagnosis and proof, and concerns
regarding disproof and causation of these injuries. The impor-
6 Id. at 543.
7 Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1192 (D. Mont. 1999).
8 King v. Bristow Helicopters Ltd., [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 745, 746 (H.L.).
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tance of expert evidence is highlighted in the recent House of
Lords decision in King v. Bristow Helicopters LtdY
In the light of all the factors involved, it is argued that it is no
longer tenable to continue to deny compensation for what was
misconceived as a "pure" mental injury arising out of aviation
accidents involving international flights. Further, it is argued
that the election to use the term "bodily injury" in the authentic
text of the Montreal Convention of 1999 may have opened the
door to claims for psychiatric injury involving bodily changes
based on evidentiary support, for such claims, arguably, have an
unintended effect of declaring an English language version to
be one of the six authentic texts of the Convention.10
I. INTRODUCTION
This article considers the vexed and much argued issues re-
garding the handling of claims for psychiatric injury caused by
accidents occurring in international flight. The governance of
international air carriage for many countries still rests in the
Warsaw Convention, which was agreed in 1929 and has been
adopted by a large number of states." The Warsaw Convention
governs the liability of air carriers to passengers on international
flights for states that have not yet adopted the Montreal Conven-
tion of 1999,12 which in any event represents a consolidation
and refinement of the better aspects of the Warsaw Convention.
It may seem strange that what may be regarded as a modern
phenomenon-international long range commercial flight-
could be governed by a convention agreed to so long ago.
There certainly have been attempts to "modernize" the Conven-
tion, but its criteria for liability for injury remains essentially un-
changed. Even the recently-in-force Montreal Convention of
1999 in Article 17 adopts a wording that is remarkably similar to
9 Id.
10 Montreal Convention of 1999, supra note 2, ch. VII (the following statement
at the conclusion of the text acknowledges the six official texts: "Done at Mon-
treal on the 28th day of May of the year one thousand nine hundred and ninety-
nine in the English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish languages, all
texts being equally authentic.") (emphasis added)).
11 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1. As of Mar. 15, 2011, there are still 152
States party to this convention listed on the ICAO's Treaty database. Description
of Status of the Warsaw Convention, ICAO, http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/
wc-hp.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
12 Montreal Convention of 1999, supra note 2.
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the original Warsaw Convention formulation. 3 Such liability is
the focus of this article.
The Warsaw Convention was designed to foster a fledgling avi-
ation industry at a time when a single accident might potentially
bankrupt an airline. 14 The drafters created a "presumed fault"
system under which the carrier accepted liability for an accident
in return for a capped level of liability in the absence of willful
misconduct on his or her part.' 5 Limits to liability were estab-
lished and compensable injuries were arguably limited to those
arising from physical affliction only.' 6 Pure psychological injury
has been specifically denied compensation within a single-
minded jurisprudence. Lest it be thought that this view hangs
over from a bygone age as writ in ancient stone, the jurispru-
dence is actually surprisingly recent, with the seminal case, East-
ern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,17 decided as recently as 1991.
The term "arguably" in the previous paragraph portends
more than the simple word implies. The debate on whether
pure psychological injury should be compensated has raged for
decades;"8 however, the courts have remained steadfast in their
denial. It is to this question the discussion turns. This article
examines the jurisprudence regarding psychological injury, and
argues that within current medical knowledge, as well as legal
understanding, pure psychological injury ought to be
compensable.
A. THE WARSAW CONVENTION LIABILITY PROVISIONS
Liability for passenger injury vests in Chapter III of the Con-
vention."9 This Chapter comprises Articles 17-30. Article 17,
detailed below, is the prime focus of this article. Essentially, for
passenger injury, the liability system created is one of presumed,
but rebuttable, fault of the carrier. If there has been an acci-
dent, under Article 17 the carrier is presumed liable up to the
liability limit defined in Article 22(1) of the Convention.2 '1 The
13 Compare id. art. 17, with Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17-8.
14 El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 170 (1999).
15 Laryn B. Zemer, Tseng v. Israel Airlines and Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention:
A Cloud Left Uncharted, 14 Am. U. INT'L L. REv. 1245, 1251; Warsaw Convention,
supra note 1, art. 25.
16 See infra Part I.A.
17 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 530 (1991).
18 Id. at 552; Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 314 N.E.2d 848, 857 (N.Y. 1974).
19 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, ch. III.
20 Id. art. 22.
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carrier also has access to several defenses under Article 20 (the
"all necessary measures" taken defense) 21 and Article 21 (con-
tributory negligence on the part of the passenger).22 Under the
unamended Convention, there is provision for the passenger to
break through the liability cap under Article 25 if he can estab-
lish willful misconduct, or intentional or reckless behavior with
knowledge that damage would probably result.
23
1. Personal Injury Provisions Under the Warsaw Convention
Article 17 provides that:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suf-
fered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
24
This provision raises issues such as who is to be considered a
"carrier" and a "passenger," the meaning of "accident," and the
precise legal meaning of "on board," "embarking," or "dis-
embarking." While each of these issues carries its own jurispru-
dence,25 they are not the present focus.
Perhaps the most debated item in the interpretation of this
article is the meaning of "death or wounding of a passenger or
any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger. ' 26 And it is to
this matter that the discussion turns. In short, the question be-
comes, "what is the meaning of 'bodily injury'?" and, in particu-
lar, "does bodily injury include pure psychological injury?" That
the debate does not seem to have turned to the alternate, viz.,
that a psychological injury suffered by a passenger might be con-
sidered as "wounding," is something the authors find strange.
But to the question of stand-alone psychological injury being
covered by bodily injury, the courts have consistently answered
21 Id. art. 20.
22 Id. art. 21.
23 Id. art. 25.
24 Id. art. 17.
25 E.g., Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 406 (1985) (defining "accident"); Sulewski
v. Fed. Express Corp., 933 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1991) (defining "carrier" and
"passenger"); Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 155 (3d
Cir. 1977) (defining "on board" and "embarking"); Hernandez v. Air Fr., 545
F.2d 279, 283-84 (1st Cir. 1976) (defining "disembarking"); Day v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975) (defining "on board" and
"embarking").
26 See E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 542 (1991).
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"no,"27 and the writers present arguments questioning this
answer.
While air carriers have defenses available to them (e.g.,
Articles 20 and 21), these are not always argued due to the Inter-
national Air Transport Association (IATA) Intercarrier Agree-
ments of 1995.28 Through these agreements, and by virtue of
the unique Article 22(1),29 IATA carriers have waived recourse
to their defenses for accidents up to 100,000 Standard Drawing
Rights (SDR) given, of course, that an accident has occurred,
though this is sometimes disputed.A°
B. ENGLISH LAw's "NERVOUS SHOCK"
While it may not be strictly correct to suggest that the drafters
of the Warsaw Convention possessed Victorian era sensibilities,
it may be informative to dwell briefly on the state of the U.K. law
of "nervous shock," as negligently inflicted psychiatric injury was
then termed. It should be emphasized that we are not turning
to domestic law to interpret particular provisions of the Conven-
tion under examination. To do so would be in contravention of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 1 It is argued
that it is relevant to touch upon the state of U.K. domestic law as
it reflected the legal understandings about mental injury at that
time operating within English law.
In the late nineteenth century, in the United Kingdom and its
colonies, recovery was not contemplated for stand-alone mental
injury.32 Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas involved a
train, a pregnant woman in a horse-drawn buggy, and a "near
miss."3 The appeal in this case turned on two issues: (1)
"[w] hether the damages awarded by the jury to the [p] laintiffs
27 E.g., f/oyd, 499 U.S. at 544; Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp.
1238, 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
28 See Agreement on Measures to Implement the IA TA Intercarrier Agreement, IATA,
[hereinafter IATA], available at http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/
measures-implementation-intercarrieragreement-feb09.pdf.
29 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1 (the relevant part of art. 22(1) being re-
flected in these words: "Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the pas-
senger may agree to a higher limit of liability.").
30 IATA, supra note 28.
31 See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (internal law and observance of treaties, which notes that "[a]
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law asjustification for its failure
to perform a treaty").
32 Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas (1888) 13 App. Cas. 222 (Austl.).
33 Id.
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... [were] too remote"; and (2) "whether proof of 'impact'
[was] necessary... to maintain the action. '34 The first issue was
decisive before the Privy Council. Sir Richard Couch stated the
majority view that "the first question, whether the damages
[were] too remote, should have been answered in the affirma-
tive. 35 Mrs. Coultas' damages, arising from her terror at seeing
the train approaching, "unaccompanied by any actual physical
injury, but occasioning a nervous or mental shock [could not]
be considered a consequence which, in the ordinary course of
things, would flow from the negligence of the gate-keeper.
36
Soon, however, in Dulieu v. White, fear of imminent harm to
oneself was accepted as a ground for claiming nervous shock. 7
Justice Kennedy emphasized the need for the plaintiff to estab-
lish "damage to herself' and causation, "a natural and continu-
ous sequence uninterruptedly connecting the breach of duty
with the damage as cause and effect. ' 38 The "control mecha-
nism" for duty of care in negligence added by Dulieu v. White was
that "[t]he shock [... ] must ... arise[ ] from a reasonable fear
of immediate personal injury to oneself. 39
In the United Kingdom, the incremental creep of the law con-
tinued in Hambrook v. Stokes, a case that preceded the Warsaw
Convention by less than five years.40 This case involved a run-
away lorry, children walking up a street, and the mother farther
down the same street, who saw the lorry rushing round a bend
towards her, fearing that it had run down her children. A by-
stander told her that a child answering the description of one of
her children had been injured.4' The mother suffered a severe
shock, which the court accepted eventually led to her death.42
In fact, the daughter had been injured and was taken to hospi-
tal. The mother, who was pregnant, suffered a "severe hemor-
34 Id.
35 Id. at 226 ("[T]hey [their Lordships] are of opinion that the first question,
whether the damages are too remote, should have been answered in the affirma-
tive, and on that ground, without saying that 'impact' is necessary, that the judg-
ment should have been for the [d]efendants.").
36 Id.
37 Dulieu v. White, [1901] 2 K-B. 669.
38 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting THOMAS G. SHEAr.AN & AMASA A.
REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 7 (2d ed. 1980)).
39 Id. at 675.
40 Hambrook v. Stokes, [1925] 1 K.B. 141.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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rhage.'43 Six weeks later, the mother was operated on and a
dead fetus was removed from her. Tragically, she died a few
days later. The case was brought by her husband under Lord
Campbell's Act.44 The majority judgment of Lord Justices
Bankes and Atkin indicated that the position adopted in Coultas
was no longer good law." Lord Atkin further rejected the limi-
tation imposed by Justice Kennedy in Dulieu v. White that the
shock must arise from fear for one's own safety: "I can find no
principle to support the self-imposed restriction stated in the
judgment of Justice Kennedy, in Dulieu v. White & Sons[,] that
the shock must be a shock which arises from a reasonable fear of
immediate personal injury to oneself."46
Lord Atkin's comments also reflect the position under the do-
mestic law of torts in England in 1924, five years prior to the
Warsaw conference:
The legal effects of injury by shock have undoubtedly developed
in the last thirty or forty years. At one time the theory was held
that damage at law could not be proved in respect of personal
"injuries", unless there was some injury which was variously called
"bodily" or 'physical," but which necessarily excluded an injury
which was only "mental." There can be no doubt at the present
day that this theory is wrong.47
Thus, the assertion by the U.S. Supreme Court in Floyd v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., that stand alone mental injury in 1929 in the
United Kingdom was not compensable is open to question.4
In Floyd, there is also an acknowledgement made that a "cause
of action for psychic injury.., was possible under French law in
43 Id. at 142.
44 Id. at 141.
45 Id. at 157 (Lord Atkin).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 154.
48 SeeE. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 545 (1991) ("Although French law
recognized recovery for certain types of mental distress long before the Conven-
tion was drafted, . . . in common-law jurisdictions mental distress generally was
excluded from recovery in 1929."). Consequently, it was no surprise when the
Court concluded: "In sum, neither the Warsaw Convention itself nor any of the
applicable French legal sources demonstrates that 'lesion corporelle' should be
translated other than as 'bodily injury'-a narrow meaning excluding purely
mental injuries." Id. at 542. The dominant view in Floyd was in favor of a narrow
interpretation of the French words "l6sion corporelle" because (1) of their dic-
tionary meanings (Id. at 537-38), (2) French jurisprudence pre-1929 revealed no
cases to support a meaning broader than physical injury (Id. at 538), and (3) it
was consistent with the primary purpose of the contracting parties to the Conven-
tion (Id. at 546).
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1929." 4" This was joined to an assertion such an action would
not have been recognized in many other countries represented
at the Warsaw Convention. 50 However, if Lord Atkin's view in
Hambrook v. Stokes is to be accepted, then U.K. jurisprudence in
this area may best be characterized as developing and not as
supporting the contention of the Floyd court that "in common-
law jurisdictions mental distress generally was excluded from re-
covery in 1929.51
In these circumstances it may well be lamented that the Diplo-
matic Conference, considering the draft of what became the
Warsaw Convention, failed to discuss the issue: "The President:
'No one asks the floor? ... I put Article 17 to a vote."' 52 No one
counseled the Supreme Court in Floyd against attaching too
much significance to this mere omission.
C. THE ORIGIN OF "BODILY INJURY"
The term "bodily injury" is an English translation of the au-
thentic French text of the Convention where the term used was
"lesion corporelle."5 Within the jurisprudence in English speaking
countries, the word "bodily" has consistently been taken to refer
to the physical human body, and therefore injury has been seen
in terms of physically determinable and evident structural
changes to the physical body.5 4 While the externalities of bodily
wounding seemed to have prevailed in the minds of interpreting
courts, there is no doubt that modern psychiatry has long left
behind the Cartesian dichotomy of mind and body: "[E]vents
and processes with which psychiatry is concerned are both physi-
cal and mental and [...] the distinction resides not in the
49 Id. at 540.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 545.
52 SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW, OCTO-
BER 4-12, 1929, WARSAW: MINUTES 206 (R. Horner & D. Legrez trans., Rothman &
Co. 1975). This omission was also noted by Lord Steyn in King v. Bristow Helicop-
ters Ltd.: "It is common ground that the travaux preparatoires reveal no discus-
sion or mention of liability for mental injury or illness." [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
745 (H.L.).
53 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17. The full French language text of
art. 17 reads: "Le transporteur est responsible du dommage survenu en cas de
mort, de blessure or de toute autre 1sion corporelle subie par un voyageur lor-
sque l'accident qui a caus6 le dommage s'est produit a bord de l'aeronef ou au
cours de toutes operations d'embarquement et de d~barguement." Id.
54 Hoyd, 499 U.S. at 536.
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events and processes but in the linguistic/conceptual framework
used in referring to them. 55
In modern medicine, our view of the body has advanced to a
point where the distinction between the so-called physical and
the so-called psychological is an artificial construct that has been
dispensed with in modern medicine. Society, as reflected in the
courts, ought also to dispense with this false distinction.
D. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC. V. FLOYD
1. Authority for the Interpretation of "Bodily Injury"
Prior to 1991, when Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floy&6 was decided,
many cases considered the meaning of "bodily injury" in a some-
what ad hoc manner. Floyd has been the precedential pivot for
most subsequent cases in multiple jurisdictions, including the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia; that is, until
the 2001 House of Lords decision in King v. Bristow Helicopters
Ltd.57
2. The Facts in Floyd
Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of a unanimous
Court, recited the following facts:
On May 5, 1983, an Eastern Airlines flight departed from Miami,
bound for the Bahamas. Shortly after takeoff, one of the plane's
three jet engines lost oil pressure. The flight crew shut down the
failing engine and turned the plane around to return to Miami.
Soon thereafter, the second and third engines failed due to loss
of oil pressure. The plane began losing altitude rapidly, and the
passengers were informed that the plane would be ditched in the
Atlantic Ocean. Fortunately, after a period of descending flight
without power, the crew managed to restart an engine and land
the plane safely at Miami International Airport.5 8
The plaintiffs,
a group of passengers [including Floyd] on the flight, brought
separate complaints against [the airline,] Eastern Airlines,
Inc.. . ., each claiming damages solely for mental distress arising
out of the incident.... Eastern conceded that the engine failure
and subsequent preparations for ditching the plane amounted to
55 Aviel Goodman, Organic Unity Theory: The Mind-Body Problem Revisited, 148(5)
Am. J. PSYCHiATRY 553, 562 (1991).
56 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 530.
57 King, [20021 1 Lloyd's Rep. 745.
58 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 533.
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an "accident" under Article 17 of the Convention but argued that
Article 17 also [made] physical injury a condition of liability.59
3. Case History
The District Court concluded that "mental anguish alone
[was] not compensable under Article 17.''6° The court relied on
an "analysis of the [original] French text and negotiating history
of the Convention" to reach this decision.6
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed this
decision, holding that "the phrase 'ldsion corporelle' in the au-
thentic French text of Article 17 encompasse[d] purely emo-
tional distress. '6 2 This court "examined the French legal
meaning of the term..., the concurrent and subsequent history
of the Convention, and cases interpreting Article 17."63
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on application to re-
solve an alleged conflict between the appellate court decision
and the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Rosman v.
Transworld Airlines, Inc.,64 "which held that purely psychic
trauma [was] not compensable under Article 17."65
4. The Argument in Floyd
The Supreme Court's argument proceeded as follows: It first
provided an overarching principle, quoting the statement from
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk: "When interpreting a
treaty, we begin with the text of the treaty and the context in
which the written words are used."66
It went on to state:
Other general rules of construction may be brought to bear on
difficult or ambiguous passages .... [And] treaties are construed
more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their
meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of
59 Id.
60 Id. at 534.
61 Id. at 533 (citing Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152,
1154 (D.N.M. 1973)).
62 F/oyd, 499 U.S. at 535 (citing 872 F.2d 1462, 1480 (11th Cir. 1989)).
63 Id.
64 Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1974).
65 F/oyd, 499 U.S. at 535.
66 Id. (quoting Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694,
699 (1988)).
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the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction
adopted by the parties.67
The Court proceeded to argue in three phases. While the au-
thors report the argument as given by the Court in the judg-
ment, we also express concern at certain inconsistencies in the
argument, which will be discussed shortly. They are not seized
upon in this mere outline.
a. Phase One-Textual
The Court argued that as the text of the Convention was in
French, "the French text must guide our analysis. '68  The
French text of Article 17 is:
Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de
mort, de blessure ou de toute autre 16sion corporelle subie par
un voyageur lorsque l'accident qui a caus6 le dommage s'est
produit : bord de l'aronef ou au cours de toutes operations
d'embarquement et de debarquement.69
This is translated as:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by
a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sus-
tained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking."y
The operative section was seen as "en cas de mort, de blessure
ou de toute autre lesion corporelle," or "the death or wounding
of a passenger or any other bodily injury. 71 And the Court re-
garded it as most important to ascribe textual equivalence to
"bodily injury" and "l6sion corporelle":
Therefore, the narrow issue presented here is whether, under
the proper interpretation of "1sion corporelle," [mort, blessure,
67 Id. (quoting Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 700; Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396
(1985)). These statements are loosely consistent with the treaty interpretation
requirements under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31(1)
("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty, in the light of its object and
purpose.") and 32 (Supplementary Means of Interpretation), which provides sup-
port for examining supplementary means, such as the preparatory work of the
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion. Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, supra note 31.
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or 1sion corporelle] is satisfied when a passenger has suffered
only a mental or psychic injury .... We must consider the
"French legal meaning" of "1sion corporelle" for guidance as to
the shared expectations of the parties to the Convention."2
The authors emphasize the Court's desire to find "the shared
expectations of the parties. 7 3
Recourse was first held to bilingual dictionaries. It was consid-
ered that these dictionaries suggested that "l6sion corporelle"
should be translated as "bodily injury."74 Given the view that
corporelle was correctly translated as bodily, the Court concluded
that "[t] hese translations, if correct, clearly suggest that Article
17 does not permit recovery for purely psychic injuries. 7 5
The Court noted that "dictionary definitions may be too gen-
eral for purposes of treaty interpretation, ' 76 but it felt that the
concerns regarding possible misinterpretation, if any, were also
allayed when it noted that "the dictionary translation accords
with the wording used in the 'two main translations of the 1929
Convention in English,"' namely the English and the American
translations. 77
Having satisfied itself that the term was properly translated-
on dictionary perusal-as "bodily injury," the Court then sought
to examine the sources of law that French jurists would rely on
in interpreting this term. 78 These sources were said to be legisla-
tion, judicial decisions, and scholarly writing.79
In legislative matters, the Court argued that there was no
French legal provision in force in 1929 that contained the term
"ldsion corporelle." 0 It noted that the scope of compensable
injuries in French law was encapsulated in the French Civil
72 Id. at 536.
73 Id.
74 The dictionaries consulted by the F/oyd Court included: (i) J. JERAUTE, VO-
CABULAIRE FRANCAIS-ANGLAIS ET ANGLAIs-FRANcAIs DE TERMES ET LocUTIONS
JURIDIQUES 205 (1953), which translates "bodily harm" or "bodily injury" as "le-
sion ou blessure corporelle," the term "lesion" as "injury, damage, prejudice or
wrong," and gave as one sense of "corporel" the English word "bodily"; and (ii)
GRAND LAROUSSE DE LA LANGUE FRANcAISE 1833 (1987), which defines "lesion" as
a "[m]odification de la structure d'un tissu vivant sous l'influence d'une cause
morbide." F/oyd, 499 U.S. at 536.
75 Id. at 536-37.
76 Id. at 537.
77 Id. (quoting R. MANKIEWICZ, THE LIABILITY REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL
AIR CARRIER 197 (1981)).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 538.
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Code, Article 1382 (translated): "Every act whatever of man
which causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it
happened to repair it."8 1
In examining case determinations, the Court also observed
that no French court decisions during or before 1929 explained
the phrase "lesion corporelle. '' 2 They stated that the only such
cases were relatively recent, in the context of "automobile acci-
dents and other incidents."' 3 It was felt that these supported the
narrow view of the term, though recent use could not be used to
ascertain the original drafters' view.84
The Court next turned to scholarly writing and stated that
leading up to 1929, it could not find any material "indicating
that 'lesion corporelle' embraced psychic injury." 5 The Court
was critical of writers8 6 who, it is claimed, drew on 1929 French
tort law compensability for psychological distress as justification
for the more liberal view in Aviation Law, and dismissed these
considerations:
We find it noteworthy, moreover, that scholars who read "lesion
corporelle" as encompassing psychic injury do not base their ar-
gument on explanations of this term in French cases or French
treatises or even in the French Civil Code; rather, they chiefly
rely on the principle of French tort law that any damage can
"give rise to reparation when it is real and has been verified." We
do not dispute this principle of French law. However, we have
been directed to no French case prior to 1929 that allowed recov-
ery based on that principle for the type of mental injury claimed
here-injury caused by fright or shock-absent an incident in
which someone sustained physical injury.8 7
The Court saw its overall task as to "give the specific words of
the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of
the contracting parties. On the basis of its textual analysis,
the Court stated that it
[found] it unlikely that those parties' apparent understanding of




84 Id. at 538-39.
85 Id. at 539.
86 Id.; see GEORGETE MILLER, LABILIrY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT: THE
WARSAW SYSTEM IN MUNICIPAL COURTS 128 (1977) (arguing that "a liberal inter-
pretation of Article 17 would be more in line with the spirit of the Convention").
87 /oyd, 499 U.S. at 539-40 (internal citations omitted).
88 Id. at 540 (quoting Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985)).
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displaced by a meaning abstracted from the French law of dam-
ages. Particularly is this so when the cause of action for psychic
injury that evidently was possible under French law in 1929
would not have been recognized in many other countries repre-
sented at the Warsaw Convention.8 9
And, "[i] n sum, neither the Warsaw Convention itself nor any of
the applicable French legal sources demonstrates that 'lesion
corporelle' should be translated other than as 'bodily injury'-a
narrow meaning excluding purely mental injuries."90
In the light of a short consideration of the structure of the
Convention, in which it was noted that some writers considered
that if mental injury was to be excluded it would have been spe-
cifically stated as such, the Court was, however, prepared to con-
cede "because a broader interpretation of 'l6sion corporelle'
reaching purely mental injuries is plausible, and the term is
both ambiguous and difficult, [the Court had to] turn to addi-
tional aids to construction." 1 And this was a statement justify-
ing its entry to phase two of its reasoning.
b. Phase Two-The Negotiating History of the Convention
The Court stated that "[t]ranslating 'l6sion corporelle' as
'bodily injury' is consistent, we think, with the negotiating his-
tory of the Convention.9 °2
The majority of the conferencing for the Convention took
place in Paris in 1925, and the Court stated that the Paris Con-
ference protocol specified that "[t]he carrier is liable for acci-
dents, losses, breakdowns, and delays,"9 3 and that this almost
certainly would have allowed for pure psychological injury. 4
However, it noted that a commission of experts (the Comit6 In-
ternational Technique d'ExpertsJuridiques Ariens, or CITEJA)
appointed to refine the agreements of the Paris Conference sub-
sequently split the liability into three areas, one for each of pas-
senger injury, goods damage, and delay. 5 Although there was
no immediate evidence as to the reason, the final wording for
89 Id.
90 Id. at 542.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. (quoting Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 401 (1985)).
94 Id. (quoting Gregory C. Sisk, Recovery for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw
Convention: The Elusive Search for the French Legal Meaning of Lsion Corporelle, 25
TEX. INT'L LJ. 127, 142 (1990)).
95 Id. at 542-43.
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Article 17 was changed by CITEJA, which the Court believed in-
dicated that a narrow interpretation was intended.9 6 Further, it
claimed that there was no indication that the drafters consid-
ered psychic injury at all.97 The Court considered that, as "many
jurisdictions did not recognize recovery for mental injury at that
time," "the drafters most likely would have felt compelled to
make an unequivocal reference to purely mental injury if they
had specifically intended to allow such recovery."98 It felt that
such was the case with the Berne Convention on rail travel,99
which referred to "! l'integrite corporelle" which was later
amended to "l'intdgrit6 physique ou mentale."' °
The Court finally stated that:
The narrower reading of "lesion corporelle" also is consistent
with the primary purpose of the contracting parties to the Con-
vention: limiting the liability of air carriers in order to foster the
growth of the fledgling commercial aviation industry.
Whatever may be the current view among Convention signato-
ries, in 1929 the parties were more concerned with protecting air
carriers and fostering a new industry than providing full recovery
to injured passengers, and we read "lesion corporelle" in a way
that respects that legislative choice.'
c. Phase Three-The Influence of Later Convention
Meetings
In the final phase of its argument, the Court concluded that,
"on balance, the evidence of the post-1929 'conduct' and 'inter-
pretations of the signatories,' supports the narrow translation of
'l6sion corporelle.' "102
A subsequent meeting was held in Madrid in 1951 and the
Court quoted the meeting documents:
The French delegate to the committee proposed this substitu-
tion[, "affection corporelle" for "lesion corporelle,"] because, in
his view, the word "lesion" was too narrow, in that it "presup-
posed a rupture in the tissue, or a dissolution of continuity"
which might not cover an injury such as mental illness or lung
96 Id. at 543.
97 Id. at 544.
98 Id. at 544-45.
9 International Convention Concerning the Carriage of Passengers and Lug-
gage by Rail, Berne, Switz., Oct. 25, 1952, 242 U.N.T.S. 355, 390.
100 Toyd, 499 U.S. at 545.
10, Id. at 546.
102 Id. (quoting Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 403 (1985)).
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congestion caused by a breakdown in the heating apparatus of
the aircraft. The United States delegate opposed this change if it
"implied the inclusion of mental injury or emotional distur-
bances or upsets which were not connected with or the result of
bodily injury," but the committee adopted it nonetheless. Al-
though the committee's proposed amendment was never subse-
quently implemented, its discussion and vote in Madrid suggest
that, in the view of the 20 signatories on the committee, "lesion
corporelle" in Article 17 had a distinctly physical scope.1"3
The Court referred back to the decision of the Court of Appeals
in Floyd and found that it had relied on three international
agreements, the Hague Protocol of 1955,04 the Montreal Agree-
ment of 1966,105 and the Guatemala City Protocol of 1971.06
The Hague Protocol was arguably the most important of these
three instruments in terms of changes to the text of the treaty,
especially given that the Guatemala City Protocol did not enter
into force and that the Montreal Interim Agreement was an in-
tercarrier agreement whose primary focus was the liability limit.
With the Hague Protocol, the Floyd Court was of the view that:
While the authentic French version of Article 3 retained the
phrase "loesion corporelle," the authentic English version of the
Hague Protocol, which was proposed by the United States dele-
gation, used the phrase "personal injury." Citing Saks, the Court
of Appeals treated the Hague Protocol's use of "personal injury"
as a "subsequent interpretation of the signatories" that "helps
clarify the meaning" of "lesion corporelle." However, we do not
accept the argument that the Hague Protocol signatories in-
tended "personal injury" to be an interpretive translation of "l-
sion corporelle" where there is no evidence that they intended
the authentic English text to effect a substantive change in, or
clarification of that term. Moreover, the portion of Article 3 of
the Hague Protocol in which "personal injury" appears is con-
cerned solely with informing passengers that when the conven-
tion "governs" it "in most cases limits the liability of carriers for
death or personal injury." It may be, therefore, that the signato-
ries used "personal injury" not as an interpretive translation of
103 Id. at 547 (internal citations omitted).
104 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929,
opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371.
105 43 C.A.B. 819, Agreement No. 18900, approved by Order No. E-23680.
106 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929
as Amended by the Protocol Done at The Hague on 28 September 1955, opened
for signature Mar. 8, 1971, ICAO Doc. 8932.
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"lesion corporelle" but merely as a way of giving a summary
description of the limitations of liability imposed by the
Convention.0 7
The Court felt also that it should examine interpretations of
"h6sion corporelle" in other jurisdictions. It cited the case of Cie
Air France v. Teichner' 0 (also including Daddon v. Air France 9 ) in
the Israeli Courts, where purely psychic injury was allowed. 10
The Floyd Court, referring to the Israeli view that this was "desir-
able jurisprudential policy" given the post-1929 development of
the aviation industry and the evolution of Anglo-American and
Israeli law to allow for recovery for psychic injury in certain cir-
cumstances, still felt unpersuaded.Ill
5. Judgment
The conclusion of the Court was as follows:
We conclude that an air carrier cannot be held liable under Arti-
cle 17 when an accident has not caused a passenger to suffer
death, physical injury, or physical manifestation of injury. Al-
though Article 17 renders air carriers liable for "damage sus-
tained in the event of' ("dommage survenu en cas de") such
injuries, we express no view as to whether passengers can recover
for mental injuries that are accompanied by physical injuries.' 1 2
E. CRITICAL COMMENTS ON THE JUDGMENT
The majority judgment in Foyd, written by Justice Marshall, as
we have established, purported to base itself on traditional treaty
interpretation techniques. It searched for the ordinary meaning
of the words used and looked to the object and purposes of the
treaty.1 3 "Even if [the Court] were to agree that allowing recov-
ery for purely psychic injury [was] desirable as a policy goal [as
was the Israeli Court's contention], [the Court] cannot give ef-
fect to such policy without convincing evidence that the signato-
107 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 548-49 (internal citations omitted).
108 Cie Air Fr. v. Teichner, 39 Revue Franqaise de Droit Arien, at 243, 23 Eur.
Tr. L., at 102.
- (1984) 1 S&B Av. R. VII/141 (Isr. Sup. Ct.); see also discussion infra Part
II.G.4.
110 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 551.
III Id. at 551 (quoting Cie Air Fr. v. Teichner, 39 Revue Franqaise de Droit
Adrien, at 243, 23 Eur. Tr. L., at 102).
112 Id. at 552 (internal citations omitted).
113 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 31, art. 31(1).
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ries' intent with respect to Article 17 would allow such
recovery." '14
Where the court in Floyd differs from the "norm" of treaty in-
terpretation is in the manner of its recourse to supplementary
materials and in its dealing with the prior jurisprudence. Under
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
which, even for non-signatory states, represents a statement of
pre-existing customary international law, recourse to supple-
mentary means of interpretation may be had.115 Such recourse,
under Article 32, does not mandate the drawing of a line under
1929 and discounting post-1929 writings that reflect on the
drafters' intentions. However, this is precisely what the Floyd
court has done in its dismissal of the writings of George Ripert
and Yvonne J. Blanc-Dannery that were considered in Palagonia
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., a 1978 decision of the Supreme
Court of New York. 16 Not even a relatively narrow focus justi-
fies excluding writings that reflect on the drafters 1929 inten-
tions, i.e., "the shared expectations of the contracting parties"
(to borrow a phrase from the majority judgment in Floyd). 7
This exclusion is difficult tojustify alone on the basis that Ripert
was the French delegate to the Diplomatic Conference in War-
saw in 1929. Further, weight needs to be given to the fact that at
the 1929 conference, Ripert observed that the convention was
one "which is drawn for a few years.""' It would appear that not
even the drafters saw the liability system that they created as one
that existed to meet anything more than immediate needs.
It would not seem wise that aviation should remain "the odd
man out" based on a shackling to 1929. The nature of change
in the aviation industry suggests that one is dealing with an in-
dustry tremendously different from that in 1929 and that the
intent of its governance should reflect that change. Indeed, it is
disappointing that the Madrid meeting was not recognized for
its main thrust-that "ldsion corporelle" interpreted as "bodily
114 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 551.
115 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 31, art. 32.
116 See Floyd, 499 U.S. at 543 n.9; Palagonia v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 110
Misc. 2d 478, 482 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
117 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 540.
118 SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW, supra
note 52, at 90 ("If this Convention of air law is to be applied during one or two
centuries, I would perhaps share the fears of Mr. Pittard, but it's a question of a
stabilization which was done in practically every country, for a Convention which
is drawn for a few years, and I believe that when you will have fixed the present
French franc, you will add nothing in saying 'gold franc."').
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injury" was far too narrow and that a broader reading was
agreed upon.
There were several places where the Court stated that
"clearly" the term used did not include a physical component
(e.g., the bilingual dictionaries where only one provision sug-
gested physicality)."19 The writers wonder if "clearly" has been
confused with "conveniently" in this instance.
While the Court in Floyd acknowledged that "treaties are con-
strued more liberally than private agreements," and that "[the
Court] may look beyond the written words to the history of the
treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted
by the parties,' 120 the Court seemed reluctant to do so except in
the narrowest of senses:
Therefore, the narrow issue presented here is whether, under
the proper interpretation of "lesion corporelle," [mort, blessure,
or lesion corporelle] is satisfied when a passenger has suffered
only a mental or psychic injury. We must consider the French
legal meaning" of "lesion corporelle" for guidance as to the
shared expectations of the parties to the Convention.121
In Floyd, the Court rested strongly on the notion that in
France and other jurisdictions mental injury was not contem-
plated. However, this seems not to be the case, especially when
the Court acknowledges the French Code provision that
"[e]very act whatever of man which causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."' 122 Rather
than using this as an argument that mental injury ought to have
been explicitly mentioned if it was intended, it would perhaps
have been more enlightened to accept that recovery for mental
injury was common ground and thus was not especially men-
tioned for that reason.
Comments regarding the Berne Rail Convention might in fact
more be taken as the drafters' learning from the 1929 experi-
ence when twenty-two years later they framed their conven-
tion.12' The Court in Floyd accepts that the Berne Convention
recognizes mental injury, but it states that post-1929 widening of
the Convention cannot justify a departure from the 1929 word-
ing.124 This was an excellent opportunity for the expression of
119 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 536-37.
120 Id. at 535 (quoting Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985)).
121 Id. at 536.
122 Id. at 538.
123 See id. at 545-46.
124 Id.
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"desirable jurisprudential policy" which the Court failed to take
up.
The Floyd court referred to Miller and criticized her basing
her argument on an understanding of French tort law alone.
125
This is despite the Court's insistence on the meaning of the
French and its admitted non dispute with the precepts of
French torts. But the Court argued that the meaning of the
convention was shared by all. 126 In commenting on Miller in
this way, using "alone" in the above, the Court does her an injus-
tice. Miller is quite definite in suggesting that "the issue was not
one of translation.' 1 27 She also stated:
Both Courts in [Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. and Husserl v.
Swiss Air Transport Co.]128 made it clear that nobody questioned
that the English text was an accurate translation of the French
text. Any discrepancy at that level would have had to be solved in
favour of the French text since the Convention was drawn up in
French only. The issue was the relevance of French legal con-
cepts as a means of interpreting the Convention. The rulings in
Husserl and Rosman, which held that the treaty should be con-
strued in the light of American law, clearly articulate an attitude
shared by a number of other courts. 129 But this has been re-
jected by several federal courts where French law concepts were
used to interpret the Convention in order to better understand
the technical meaning of its text, and also to ascertain more ac-
curately the intent of its drafters.' °
Miller offers a detailed critique of the thinking of the Courts
and would seem to have been dismissed lightly without refer-
ence to the substance of her further arguments-the unreliabil-
ity and lack of precision in the meaning of "corporelle," the
drafting history of the Convention and its later incarnations, an
unwarranted interpretation of the CITEJA deliberations and
submissions, the fact that Article 17 sets conditions and not lim-
125 Id. at 539-40; see MILLER, supra note 86, at 119.
126 Rloyd, 499 U.S. at 544.
127 MILLER, supra note 86, at 119.
128 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1249 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848, 859 (N.Y. 1974).
129 Miller cites Kahn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 12 Avi. 18032 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1973), and Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, 452 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1971), stating
that the Court placed a limit to the extent on which domestic law concepts could
be used. MILLER, supra note 86, at 119.
13o Id. (citing Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977), Block v. Compagnie
Nationale Air Fr., 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), and Burnett v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 368 F. Supp 1152 (D.N.M. 1973)).
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its, the real lack of distinction between physical and mental inju-
ries despite claims to the contrary, the non-warranted
conclusions from Berne, and so on. 131 Miller, probably the most
authoritative writer on this subject, would seem to have been
dismissed too lightly. Nonetheless, Floyd, as a decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court, has been used as a dominant precedent for
the subsequent denial of recompense for mental injuries since
its determination in 1991.
It is highly noteworthy that the Court expressed "no view as to
whether passengers can recover for mental injuries that are ac-
companied by physical injuries."' 32 The notion of mental inju-
ries accompanied by physical injuries will be returned to later,
though it is unfortunate that Floyd has been used as precedent in
this area also against a specific non-entry into the topic.
F. JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR TO FLOYD
Prior to Floyd, a small number of cases were decided and Floyd
properly attempted to resolve the degree of uncertainty and
conflict engendered by the prior cases. In 1972, in Husserl v.
Swiss Air Transport Co., the court prefigured Floyd.' The court
relied on Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France 4 on the pre-
mise that the "binding meaning of the terms .. .is the French
legal meaning.'"135 In the light of the above discussion, the use
of the term "legal meaning" is somewhat enigmatic where the
legal usage of the term could be regarded as actually encompass-
ing the psychological. Article 17 was held by the court of first
instance to be controlled by "toute autre lesion corporelle"
(even though "blessure" was thought to comprehend not only a
physical wound but also any other hurt or injury) and it held
that, in consequence, "mental anguish and suffering are not
comprehended within the Warsaw Convention. 136
In a separate opinion arising from the same case, however,
mental injury was held to be within "16sion corporelle.' ' 37 The
court found that "the types of injuries enumerated should be
construed expansively to encompass as many types of injury as
131 See id. at 120-22.
132 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552-53 (1991).
133 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., Ltd., 351 F. Supp. 702, 708 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), afJ'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973).
134 Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air Fr., 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967).
is5 Husserl, 351 F. Supp. at 708 (quoting Block, 386 F.2d at 330).
136 Id.
137 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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are colorably within the ambit of the enumerated types. Mental
and psychosomatic injuries are colorably within that ambit and
are, therefore, comprehended by Article 17.138
In 1973, Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. dealt with "severe
emotional trauma from the actions of ... hijackers [in which
the plaintiffs feared] that their lives [were] in jeopardy. 139
Both parties to the dispute agreed that the Warsaw Convention
applied to the hijacking and the court noted that the plaintiffs
"also suffered various other physical ailments from their
confinement. "140
Again the court held that "the French legal meaning must
govern."'1 41 The court noted that "[i]n this era, internal French
law predicated a carrier's liability on contract, allowing a passen-
ger to recover for mental as well as physical injuries. "142
In discussion, the court in Burnett agreed with the definition
by Colin, Capitant and de la Morandiere of lsion corporelle as "an
infringement of physical integrity"14 3 and stated that "[t]he defi-
nition gives not the slightest indication that mental injuries are
to be included within its domain.1 44 But its view, importantly,
drew on the perceived sharp distinction in American and
French law between physical and mental injury.
As far as the Convention's history, the court drew a strong
inference "that the Convention intended to narrow the other-
wise broad scope of liability . . . and preclude recovery for
mental anguish alone.' 1 45 Once again, the fact that the Berne
Rail Convention made an explicit distinction was used as indica-
tion of differing intent and as indication that Warsaw did not.
146
The conclusion was that "plaintiffs may recover in this action for
any such emotional anxiety that they can demonstrate resulted
from a bodily injury suffered as a consequence of the
hijacking."'4 7
138 Id. at 1250.
139 Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152, 1153 (D.N.M.
1973).
140 Id.
141 Id. at 1155.
142 Id. at 1157.
143 Id. at 1156 (citing AMBROISE COLIN & HENRI CAPrANT, TRAITE DE DROIT
CIVIL at No. 65 (Leon Julliot de la Morandiere ed., 1959)).
144 Id. at 1157.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1158.
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In 1974, appeals in the cases of Rosman v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc. and Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. were heard to-
gether.1 48 These cases prompted the Floyd appeal. The court
succinctly found that the "defendant [was] liable for plaintiffs
palpable, objective bodily injuries, including those caused by the
psychic trauma of the hijacking, and for the damages flowing
from those bodily injuries, but not for the trauma as such or for
the nonbodily or behavioral manifestations of that trauma."149
Further, a claim for bodily injury must "be predicated upon
some objective identifiable injury to the body .... [and] there
must be some causal connection between the bodily injury and
the 'accident[,]' . . . whether the bodily injury was caused by
physical impact, by the physical circumstances of the confine-
ment or by psychic trauma. 1 5 °
The coexistence of physical and mental had been recognized
only to a small degree by the courts until Floyd. In Floyd, the U.S.
Supreme Court noted that it did not have to decide on liability
for mental injuries that are merely accompanied by physical inju-
ries. 151 In Husserl, no opinion on the coexistence was offered.152
In Burnett, the Court held that a plaintiff could recover for emo-
tional anxiety resulting from physical injury (and probably vice
versa as in Rosman below) given the "well recognized principle
of law allowing recovery for mental anguish resulting from the
occurrence of a bodily injury, the emotional distress being di-
rectly precipitated by the bodily injury being considered as a
part of the bodily injury itself.'1 53 In Rosman, the Court felt that
"plaintiffs should be allowed to prove damages for palpable, ob-
jective bodily injuries suffered, whether caused by psychic
trauma or by the physical conditions on the aircraft, irrespective
of impact, but not for psychic trauma alone."' 54
In these cases prior to Floyd, the thinking would seem to be
somewhat ad hoc: in one case mere accompaniment of physical
and mental may be allowable; in another mental anguish result-
ing from bodily trauma; and in a third, physical trauma caused
148 Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848, 850 (N.Y. 1974).
149 Id. at 857.
150 Id. at 856.
151 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991).
152 See Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1250-53 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
153 Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152, 1158 (D.N.M.
1973).
154 Rosman, 314 N.E.2d at 850.
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by mental trauma. Floyd, in fact, made an enigmatic statement
causing one to ask whether the physical and mental manifesta-
tion even had to exist in the same individual-absent an inci-
dent in which someone sustained physical injury. 55
Though causation seems rightly to be assumed, the view of
courts on its co-existence and its mechanisms seems fuzzy, and
modern medicine is far more advanced than this. Further, the
courts do not seem sure that trauma (either as an isolated term,
or as an explicit concept) can be as much a mental matter as a
physical one.
John F. Easton et al., drew attention to the concurrence and
noted several categories of cases, including those exemplified
by:
* pure mental injury unaccompanied by physical injury or
unaccompanied by physical manifestation of injury;
* mental injury manifest in physical injury;
* mental injury unrelated to physical harm; and
* mental injury flowing from physical harm.'56
None of these would seem to be compensable under current
Warsaw jurisprudence, as enunciated by Floyd. And, indeed, the
distinction between a malady and its manifestation seems unap-
preciated, yet the distinction is crucial.
The present writers emphasize this latter point, that there is
not any real appreciation in the judgments of the differences
between symptoms and injuries, manifestations and pathologies,
symptoms and causes. Any manifestation can only amount to
symptomatology, as a symptom is by definition a manifestation.
A symptom in no way defines causation. The same symptom can
have multiple origins, and indeed several concurrently-the
symptom of chest pain is a useful example with causes ranging
from cardiac and pulmonary, through musculoskeletal, to psy-
chological. A symptom alone does not define a pathology or an
injury. Similarly, the term "trauma" in its usage by courts, as
well as being misunderstood in its genesis, is used imprecisely,
sometimes meaning a resulting condition, and sometimes mean-
ing an injuring agent. Judgment on a medical matter must
make medical sense.
155 Foyd, 499 U.S. at 539-40.
156 John F. Easton, Jennifer Trock & Kent Radford, Post Traumatic "Lesion
Corporelle": A Continuum of Bodily Injury Under the Warsaw Convention, 68J. AIR L. &
COM. 665, 673-90 (2003).
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Similarly, there is confusion regarding the term "psychoso-
matic," which seems to be used interchangeably with the terms
"emotional," "psychological," "psychic," or even "mental." Psy-
chosomatic conditions are concerned simply with "the interac-
tion of mind, brain, body, and social context... contributing to
the pathogenesis, course, and treatment of disease. '"157 It is not
a term usable interchangeably with a pathological process. This
interaction is explored below and is an indication of the insepa-
rability of these elements. Ultimately, considering the legacy of
Floyd, one thing seems clear: courts have stood against mental
injury alone being compensable in aviation actions.
It would be remiss of the writers not to aver again to the case
of Palagonia v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. because it stands in stark
contrast to Floyd.158 This is because Palagonia focused closely on
the meaning of "lesion corporelle" and found that it included
the concept of stand-alone mental injury as recoverable dam-
age. 59 A feature of the Palagonia judgment was the expert evi-
dence of Professor Rene H. Mankiewicz "that two of the
principal drafters of the Warsaw Convention, Dean Ripert of
France and Otto Riese of Germany, [had] written analyses in
which they [had] made it very clear that the concept of lgsion
corporelle includes psychic damage or mental disturbance.' 60 In
contrast to this view, the Court in Floyd categorically held that
(1) Article 17 does not allow recovery for purely mental in-
jury;16 ' (2) "lesion corporelle" should be correctly interpreted as
"bodily injury" to exclude purely mental injuries;'6 2 (3) such a
translation is consistent with the negotiating history of the Con-
vention; 16 3 and (4) "on balance, the evidence of the post-1929
'conduct' and 'interpretations of the [Warsaw Convention] sig-
natories' supports the narrow translation of 'lesion
corporelle.' 16 4 The Floyd Court was in clear disagreement with
the evidence of Professor Mankiewicz in Palagonia, for example,
157 Web Alert: The American Psychosomatic Society, 11(2) CURRENT PAIN & HEAD-
ACHE REPORTS 85 (2007).
158 Palagonia v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 110 Misc. 2d 478, 479 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1978).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 482.
161 E. Airlines Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991) ("We conclude that an air
carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17 when an accident has not caused a
passenger to suffer death, physical injury, or physical manifestation of injury.").
162 Id. at 542.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 546 (internal citations omitted).
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agreeing with the view put forward by Eastern Airlines that his
translation of "lesion corporelle" was "overbroad."' 65 The Court
condemned the Blanc-Dannery thesis, supervised by Ripert, on
the convenient basis that her assertions as to the meaning of
"lesion corporelle" were not supported by evidence from
CITEJA or Warsaw proceedings.'66 And yet Ripert, one of the
drafters of the 1929 text, was Blanc-Dannery's supervisor. The
Court's condemnation of the value of the Blanc-Dannery thesis
was appropriately strong, as this was a major point of conten-
tion.1 67 Once the key evidential basis of the decision in
Palagonia was repudiated, the Floyd Court was clear to make its
rulings on the matter.
G. JURISPRUDENCE SINCE FLoYD
Floyd has become the dominant precedent in U.S. jurisdic-
tions since its hearing and it has exerted strong persuasive influ-
ence in other jurisdictions. This may not surprise as it was
perhaps the first, albeit most conservative, attempt by a State's
supreme court (within its judicial hierarchy) to define and dis-
cuss the interpretive issues regarding "l6sion corporelle."
The following are judgments following Floyd. In almost all
cases the finding has been commensurate with Floyd-only the
rare case has taken a wider view.
1. Cases in the United States
In 1992, Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. was decided and
turned, not on the nature of the injury, but on the definition of
"willful misconduct" of the airline.16 Its importance was that
terrorist acts could be regarded as an "accident" within the
meaning of the Warsaw Convention while not amounting to
"willful misconduct." '169 The district court, which was over-
turned on the former point, had opined in any event that
"[s]ince Mr. Ospina suffered physical injury which then caused
him psychic harm, the award of damages to compensate for that
165 Id. at 543 n.9 ("Eastern offers persuasive evidence that Mankiewicz's transla-
tion may be overbroad.").
166 Id. at 543 n.9.
167 Id. ("In the absence of such support we find the Blanc-Dannery thesis to
have little or no value as evidence of the drafters' intent.").
-6 Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 975 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1992).
169 Id. at 37.
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harm [was] appropriate. "  Thus, the court was in harmony
with Floyd.
In the same year, the court in Chendrimada v. Air India, stated
that "plaintiffs must allege a physical injury or a manifestation of
a physical injury" to respect Floyd and that this was satisfied in
the case at hand. 71 The authors draw attention to the perceived
need for "physical injury or a manifestation of physical
injury. ' 17 2
In 1993, Bowden v. Korean Airlines Co. held that, regarding
moral damages, "none are available for mental anguish absent
physical injury," citing Floyd.1 73 In the case in question, the fact
that there was physical injury due to the explosion of a missile
allowed the claim for pain and suffering prior to death.
174
In 1994, Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. was decided. 75 Inter-
estingly a psychiatrist's view of mental injury was determined to
be inadmissible, as it was held that he did not have "legal train-
ing and [that] he did not fully grasp the meaning of the terms
'ldsion corporelles' and 'blessures.' ,,176 Further,
[p] laintiffs offered the declarations of [a mechanical engineer, a
biomechanic, and a psychiatrist]. These declarants described the
damage to the plane, the circumstances of the aborted take-off,
evacuation and fire, as well as physical and mental effects on
plaintiffs. The declarations refer to passengers generally and to
the likely events and circumstances. The declarants' failure to
connect their conclusions to any particular plaintiff makes them
irrelevant in these . . . proceedings.1 77
The nub of the injury matter was contained in the court's
statements:
170 Id.; see also Anthony Mercer, Liability of Air Carriers for Mental Injury Under the
Warsaw Convention, 28(3) Am & SPACE L. 147, 152 (2003) ("The Court held that
there was enough evidence to support the jury's verdict that [the plaintiff] suf-
fered pain and extreme psychic damage after he was injured by the bomb and
before he died and that this constituted 'damage sustained' under Article 17 of
Warsaw.").
171 Chendrimada v. Air India, 802 F. Supp. 1089, 1092 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
172 Id.
173 Bowden v. Korean Airlines Co., 814 F. Supp. 592, 598 (E.D. Mich. 1993)
("They may not recover from their grief which did not result in physical effects,
however.") (citing Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552).
174 Id. ("This is pain and suffering accompanied by physical injury, and logi-
cally, must be permitted by F/oyd.").
175 Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
176 Id. at 661.
177 Id. at 662.
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Also of concern is [the psychiatrist's] opinion that that the emo-
tional distress suffered by the plaintiffs has intrinsic physical ef-
fects. The court is not persuaded that [this] enables plaintiffs to
satisfy Floyd's requirement of bodily injury. [The psychiatrist's]
comments regarding the physiologic component of emotional
distress would apply to any near death experience, including that
suffered by the plaintiffs in Floyd.... Application of [the psychia-




Whether the recoverable damages-including emotional dis-
tress-are those caused by the bodily injury or by the accident
itself is unclear under Article 17 and Floyd .... It does not state
that the damages must be caused by the bodily injury. Causation
is not implied in the French phrase .... One construction is that
the recoverable damages need not be caused by the bodily injury,
and may instead be those caused by the accident.
179
The Jack court foresaw the following four approaches to the
mental injury issue:
1. No recovery allowed at all for emotional distress;
2. Recovery allowed for all distress as long as there was some
bodily injury;
3. Emotional distress allowed as damages for bodily injury,
but distress may include distress about the accident; and
4. Only emotional distress flowing from any bodily injury
allowed.1 8 0
The court felt that the first approach was the narrow ap-
proach used in Floyd, and was consistent with the state of law for
some signatories. However, they felt this was not a desirable ap-
proach as "it [gave] so little to the passengers" and was very one-
sided.' The second approach was considered unfair to passen-
gers who might be "fortunate enough" to sustain a minor inci-
dental bodily injury like a scratch, where others did not. 82 The
third approach was not accepted, and the court felt that the
fourth approach was their preference requiring the existence of
178 Id. at 664.
179 Id. at 665.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 665-66 ("The approach treats emotional distress as a freestanding
cause of action [which is] inconsistent with courts' rulings . . . that the Warsaw
Convention creates a cause of action, not just a limit on remedies.").
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bodily injury and mental injury in consequence. 183 In a major
sense this (re)establishes the "old status quo" with Floyd.'84 Re-
covery was not allowed for distress caused by the accident
itself.'85
Similarly, following and confirmation of Floyd was seen in:
" Bickel v. Korean Airlines Co., in which the court stated "[w] e
cannot, however, perceive any distinction ... that would
permit us to conclude that the recovery... [for] survivor's
grief [is allowable] 9";186
* Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., where emotional conse-
quences of a scalding were compensable but the purely
psychic injury of the mother of the injured child was not
compensable; 187
" Daniel v. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd., where plaintiffs were
denied damages for the inconvenience associated with de-
lay, it not falling "within the rubric of 'emotional
distress'; 188
* Turturro v. Continental Airlines, basing its decision on Floyd's
exclusion of psychosomatic illnesses from its conception of
"physical manifestation of injury";' 89
* Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd., where the court
stated, "the Court's thorough analysis simply offers no sup-
port that 'lesion corporelle' means anything other than
'bodily injury"';' 90 and
* El Al Israel Airlines Ltd. v. Tseng, clearly requiring physical
injury.' 9'
183 Id. at 666-68.
184 Id. at 667 (the court observed that "the Convention leaves the measure of
damages to the internal law of parties to the Convention").
185 Id. at 668 (stating that this approach would both make passengers' recovery
more reasonable and predictable and that it was more in harmony with the ap-
proach taken in Saks v. Air France, suggesting that "Iit]he damage is not damage
from the accident" but rather "damage from the bodily injury").
186 Bickel v. Korean Airlines Co., 83 F.3d 127, 132 (6th Cir. 1996).
187 Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1998)
("However, we agree with Judge Cedarbaum that the injury here [was] not the
earache, but the application of scalding water to treat it. We conclude that the
burning of Penina Fishman (and each of the claims arising from that incident)
was an Article 17 accident.").
188 Daniel v. Virgin At. Airways Ltd., 59 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
189 Turturro v. Cont'l Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 176-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
190 Terrafranca v. Virgin Ad. Airways Ltd., 151 F.3d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1998).
191 El Al Isr. Airlines Ltd. v. Tseng, 919 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affid in
part, rev'd in part, 122 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 525 U.S. 155
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The case of Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc. resulted from an emer-
gency landing.1 92 The plaintiff, Kathy Weaver, consequently was
diagnosed with, and was treated for, post-traumatic stress disor-
der (PTSD).193 Weaver argued that she suffered physical injury
and physical manifestations of injury, which included biochemi-
cal reactions that had physical impacts upon her brain and neu-
rological system. 94  Expert and uncontradicted evidence
supported her contention.1 95 Accepting the physicality of this
injury and not the nature of its manifestation, the court deter-
mined that "bodily injury" was satisfied and distinguished the
case from other mental injury cases while adhering to a more
modern medical conceptualization and appearing, at least su-
perficially, to be consistent with the "bodily injury"
requirement.1 "6
Similar following of the Floyd reasoning has occurred in Wal-
lace v. Korean Air,19 7 Croucher v. World Wide Right Services, Inc.,"9 8
Carey v. United Airlines,'99 Bloom v. Alaska Airlines,20 Bobian v.
Czech Airlines,2°1 and Ehrlich v. American Airlines, Inc. 212
2. United Kingdom Cases
In the United Kingdom, two relatively recent cases have dealt
with the issue of mental injury under the Warsaw Convention.
They are King v. Bristow Helicopters Ltd. (Scotland) 20 3 and In Re M
(Kelly Morris's case) .204 Kelly Morris brought an action for sex-
(1999). In reversing, the Court suggested that airline liability encompassed only
bodily injury caused by an "accident." Tseng, 525 U.S. at 173.
192 Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Mont. 1999), vacated
per stipulation, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (D. Mont. 2002).
193 Id. at 1190.
194 Id. at 1190-91.
195 Id. at 1192 .("In response, Delta has not presented evidence sufficient to
raise a genuine factual issue .... [Therefore], the injury to her brain should be
considered a 'bodily injury' as defined under the Warsaw Convention.").
196 Id.
197 Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 2000).
198 Croucher v. World Wide Flight Servs., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 501, 506-07
(D.NJ. 2000).
199 Carey v. United Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2001) ("... F/oyd
left open the question of whether . . . physical manifestations satisfy[ied] ...
'bodily injury' . . . . [The court was] persuaded . . . that they [did] not.").
200 Bloom v. Alaska Airlines, 36 F. App'x 278, 280 (9th Cir. 2002).
201 Bobian v. Czech Airlines, 232 F. Supp. 2d 319, 324-25 (D.N.J. 2002), affd,
93 F. App'x 406 (3d Cir. 2004) (ironically involving Hurricane Floyd).
202 Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 374-75 (2d Cir. 2004).
203 King v. Bristow Helicopters Ltd., [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 745, 746 (H.L.).
204 Morris v. KL.M. Royal Dutch Airlines, [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 745 (H.L.).
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ual assault on board an aircraft and did not succeed.2 °5 Her ap-
peal to the House of Lords was heard together with the appeal
brought in King.2 0 6
The appeal in King was allowed. Mr. King had been involved
in a helicopter crash where he sustained no physical injury.207
He did, however, sustain PTSD, and this led directly to a peptic
ulcer, in exacerbation of previous peptic disease.20 8 On the ba-
sis of the physicality involved (this time physicality in conse-
quence of a psychiatric condition) and in contrast with Morris,
the appeal was allowed.2 °9
Although King was decided by the House of Lords under the
Warsaw Convention, nevertheless, it provides substantial sup-
port for a "modern" interpretation of what bodily injury is. Al-
though superficially advocating the position that, under the
Warsaw Convention, there could be no recovery for claims of
purely psychological injury in the absence of physical harm, the
court indicated a preparedness to see "bodily injury" through
modern eyes based on contemporary medical evidence.210
As Lord Nicholls suggests:
The brain is part of the body. Injury to a passenger's brain is an
injury to a passenger's body just as much as an injury to any other
part of his body. Whether injury to a part of a person's body has
occurred is, today as much as in 1929, essentially a question of
medical evidence. 211
His Lordship conceded, "It may be that, in the less advanced
state of medical and scientific knowledge [seventy] years ago,
psychiatric disorders would not have been related to physical im-
pairment of the brain or nervous system. ' 21 2 However, His Lord-
ship argued that "even if that is so, this cannot be a good reason
for now excluding this type of bodily injury, if proved by satisfac-
tory evidence, from the scope of article 17.213
The enduring relevance of a Weaver-like interpretation sup-
ported by medical evidence was explicitly acknowledged by His
Lordship, stating that in Weaver, "the uncontradicted medical ev-
205 Id. at 635.
206 King, [2002] 2 A.C. 628.
207 Id. at 630.
208 Id.
20- Id. at 692.
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idence was that extreme stress could cause actual physical brain
damage. The judge observed .... that '[fWright alone is not com-
pensable, but brain injury from fright is.' 214
Lord Mackay also argues against the conceptualization of a
mind-body divide based on the level of medical knowledge in
1929.215 If evidence supports the view that there has been an
injury to the body, His Lordship supports recovery. 216 Lord
Steyn, in a carefully drafted opinion, also supports recovery if
the mental injury causes "adverse physical symptoms": "I would
hold that if a relevant accident causes mental injury or illness
which in turn causes adverse physical symptoms, such as strokes,
miscarriages or peptic ulcers, the threshold requirement of bod-
ily injury under the Convention is also satisfied. 217
In his judgment, Lord Hope turns to traditional principles of
treaty interpretation in indicating that the convention should
receive a purposive construction and, in accord with Grein v. Im-
penal Airways Ltd.218 and Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd.,2 19 that
" [t] he ordinary and natural meaning of the words used... pro-
vides the starting point. '22° Lord Hope avers to a traditional
view, consistent with the judgments in Rosman22' and loyd,2 22
that the framers choice of "ldsion corporelle" or "bodily injury"
imports a limitation that only a physical manifestation of a
mental injury is allowable. 223 However, Lord Hope acknowl-
edges that even a narrow reading does not exclude use of medi-
cal and scientific evidence:
The meaning that is to be given to the words used in the Conven-
tion must be the meaning which was to be attributed to them
when the Convention was entered into in 1929. But it must al-
ways have been intended that the application of that meaning to
the facts would depend on the evidence. The proper approach is to
214 Id. (citing Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (1999)).
215 Id. at 634.
216 Id. (Lord Mackay, 8) (In Lord Mackay's words, "I would apply the simple
test, does the evidence demonstrate injury to the body, including in that expres-
sion the brain, the central nervous system and all the other components of the
body?").
217 Id. at 641 (Lord Steyn, 20).
218 Grein v. Imperial Airways Ltd., [1937] 1 KB. 50, 74-76.
219 Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd., [1981] A.C. 251, 279 (H.L.).
220 King, 2 A.C. at 656.
221 Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1974).
222 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552-53 (1991).
223 King, 2 A.C. at 642.
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make use of the best current medical and scientific knowledge that is
available.
224
The judgment of Lord Hobhouse supports the collective view
of the authors that the silence of the Diplomatic Conference of
1929 on the issue of psychiatric injury ought not to be given
greater importance than it deserves. Lord Hobhouse cites, with
approval, the following passage from Lord Reed's judgment in
the Court of Appeal in this case: "The travaux pr(paratoires do
not support any theory that the signatories to the Warsaw Con-
vention had a specific intention either to include or to exclude
liability for psychiatric disorders. 225
On this issue of treaty interpretation Lord Hobhouse counsels
against filling this void with a positive assumption. "It is," His
Lordship asserts, "a descent into unprincipled subjectivism to
use, as do the Court of Appeal... and others have done before
them, the absence of travaux pr~paratoires as a tool of
construction. 226
The issue of what constitutes "bodily injury" is taken up by
Lord Hobhouse, who does not support the need for the injury
to manifest in an external or palpable manner in order to be
recognized as a bodily injury. Lord Hobhouse cites a ruptured
spleen or damage to an optic nerve as injuries that are bodily
injuries that may not present as conspicuous or visible inju-
ries.22 7 Emphasizing the need for plaintiffs to prove that their
alleged injuries are "bodily," Lord Hobhouse defines bodily in-
jury as "a change in some part or parts of the body of the passen-
ger which is sufficiently serious to be described as an injury. "228
His Lordship suggests that "[a] psychiatric illness may often be
evidence of a bodily injury or the description of a condition
which includes bodily injury. 2 29
While the Law Lords in King appear to have endorsed the
traditional position under the Warsaw Convention that recovery
is not possible for purely mental injury, the case represents a
watershed in interpretation of the Convention. This is because
of its support for recovery if the plaintiff can establish, through
medical evidence, that the condition complained of has caused
adverse physical symptoms. With advances in medical science, it
224 Id. at 657 (emphasis added).
225 Id. at 678 (quoting Lord Reed, 2001 SLT 126, 167 at 56).
226 Id. (emphasis added).
227 Id. at 674.
228 Id. at 675.
229 d.
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is likely that certain psychological conditions that were previ-
ously regarded as uncompensable, stand-alone mental injury
may be compensatable because they manifest in physically mea-
surable symptoms. In short, the case advances the cause of re-
course to modern medical science.
3. Australian Cases
Australian cases seem to have followed the expected Floyd
course. While the cases of American Airlines, Inc. v. Georgopo-
lous23° and Kotsambasis .v Singapore Airlines Ltd.231 are State Ap-
peal Court cases, they are the most persuasive that have been
decided in Australia to date and have not exhaustively examined
the mental injury issue, preferring to be guided by Floyd.
4. A Wider Interpretation
The only major case providing a wider view has been Daddon
v. AirFrance.232 In this case, the Israeli Court, alone in the devel-
oped world, has allowed pure psychiatric injury to be compensa-
ble in the aviation context. The Supreme Court of Israel ruled
on claims made by passengers regarding mental anguish suf-
fered while being held captive by hijackers at Entebbe Airport in
Uganda. 23 3
Lord Hope refers to the case in King in the following terms:
It held that "bodily injury" in article 17 included mental anguish
which was not accompanied by any physical injury. It reached
this conclusion after recognizing ... that the parties to the Con-
vention apparently had no intention whatsoever in that regard
.... What the court sought to do was to develop the meaning of
the word by judicial policy in the light of subsequent develop-
ments. This approach has received no support in the otherjuris-
dictions. It has been criticised on the ground that it is
impermissible to construe the Convention in the light of changes
since 1929.234
230 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Georgopoulos, No. 40762, 1996 NSW LEXIS 3402, at
*11 (S. Ct. N.S.W. 1996).
231 Kotsambasis v. Sing. Airlines Ltd., No. 40154, 1997 NSW LEXIS 895, at *17
(S. Ct. N.S.W. 1997).
232 Daddon v. Air Fr. (1984) 1 S&B Av. R. VII/141 (Isr. Sup. Ct.).
233 Id.
234 King, 2 A.C. at 667.
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H. MONTREAL CONVENTION'S USE OF "BODILY INJURY"
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for In-
ternational Carriage by Air, or Montreal 99, exists in six authen-
tic texts, including an English language version which opts for
the expression "bodily injury. '23 5 While delegates at this confer-
ence superficially appeared to have closed the door on the possi-
bility of expressly incorporating "pure" or "stand alone" mental
injury into the liability regime, in the light of the House of
Lords decision in King v. Bristow Helicopters and the state of medi-
cal knowledge at the time of the convention, it is likely that
Weaver-inspired claims will be made. Despite a substantial num-
ber of cases applying Floyd, the wording of Montreal 99 (viz,
"bodily injury") has not been tested. And while the Weaver deci-
sion garnered little support in U.S. judicial and legal circles gen-
erally, the possibilities are very real for a plaintiff to establish,
through the use of expert medical evidence, that changes to the
brain have occurred and hence "a bodily injury" has been sus-
tained. If bodily injury is seen to include mental injury (subject
to evidentiary proof), then surely the lobbyists who influenced
the shape of the Montreal Convention on this issue may yet be
seen to have failed to close the door on recovery.
III. INTRODUCING A MEDICAL VIEW
Both in 1929 and strangely solidified by the more recent Floyd
case, a line was drawn between "physical" and "mental" injury.
This has not been departed from; however, some widening of
the solid view allowed the possibility of recovery if a demon-
strated physical underpinning of mental injury could be
shown.237 Lords Steyn, Nicholls, Mackay, and Hope asserted
that there was no reason to think that the parties intended that
no account should be taken of developments in medical science
in determining the question of whether a person had sustained
a bodily injury-if the brain could be shown to be injured and
the other conditions for compensation under Article 17 were
satisfied, it would not be right to refuse compensation under the
235 Montreal Convention of 1999, supra note 2.
236 Id.
237 An approach taken in King, where Lords Nicholls, Mackay, Steyn, and
Hope, while wishing their judgment to be seen as following /oyd, nevertheless
argued that it would be wrong to regard Article 17 as limited by the state of
medical and scientific knowledge that was current in the 1920s. The author has
stated this view also with respect to the interpretation of treaties.
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Article on the ground that in 1929 an injury of that kind would
not have been capable of being demonstrated .2 3  The issue
therefore became whether or not such an injury (physical as a
basis to mental) could be demonstrated on the available
evidence.
This article now argues for a widening of the approach to
mental injury recognizing its reality and the devastation it may
cause. It will argue that the narrow approach cannot be sus-
tained on medical or other grounds, including a humanitarian
ground.
The argument is approached in two separate ways, as implicit
in previous judgments exist two quite different contentions.
First, it will be argued that to separate physical and mental in-
jury, or similarly, to regard and require one as precedent to the
other, is medically unsound. Psychiatric injury may well have
just as much physical basis as any other injury, and the discovery
of this is limited only by the limitations of our current investiga-
tive modalities. Indeed, present research indicates more and
more physical underpinning of psychiatric dysfunction and disa-
bility.239 But secondly, and even if this first is incorrect, it is of
little moment, as it is asserted that in the present day we have
reached an understanding where purely psychiatric injury is rec-
ognized as just as devastating and therefore just as "real" and
worthy of compensation for itself, as it is for physical injury,
whether it is accompanied by physical cause or association or
pathology, or not.
This article asserts that there is no physical illness that does
not have mental ramifications, and no mental illness that does
not manifest itself with physical symptomatology. It argues that
the removal of mental injury from "lesion corporelle" is an out-
dated and an untenable dichotomy, even if it once existed at all.
To do so denies just compensation to disabled and deserving
victims. Nonetheless, the present writers are sensitive to the
concerns of those who would see the wider interpretation as the
opening of floodgates. Safeguards against these concerns are
considered and are also detailed below.
There has always been a societal prejudice against mental ill-
ness, and this is entirely unfortunate and unproductive. Not
238 See King, 2 A.C. at 633.
239 See, e.g., PTSD & Physical Health, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERAN AFFAIRS, http://
www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/pages/ptsd-physical-health.asp (last updated June
15, 2010).
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only is mental illness common, it being said for example that
thirty percent of the population at any one time suffer from
symptoms supporting a diagnosis of clinical depression,24 ° but
mental reaction shading in degree to mental illness is some-
thing that is in everyone's experience at some time of life. The
exigencies of life mean that we all suffer emotional upset at
some stage or other, and this is necessary to function as fully
human beings.
To say that a person suffers from symptoms of a mental illness
(e.g., schizophrenia) is to condemn them to an odium not ex-
perienced by those that are, for example, diagnosed with a phys-
ical illness (e.g., thyrotoxicosis), yet both have physical and
mental overtones in different mixes, and both can result from
purely physical changes. The experience and diagnosis of pain,
for example is similar, having both physical and mental ele-
ments. It is simply more complex, and the diagnosis of a cause
for any given pain includes a myriad of physical causes as well as
mental causes. The distinction is not trivial, and too often indi-
viduals perpetuate the stigma if it is suggested that their pain
has a psychogenic cause-"what, are you telling me this pain is
all in my imagination?" It is similarly contended that the courts,
in separating physical and mental, are also compounding and
perpetuating the stigma. For the wise medical practitioner, the
psychogenic diagnosis is by no means pejorative-it is simply a
diagnosis which allows the most effective modalities of treat-
ment to be selected. Indeed the skilled practitioner is one capa-
ble, by training and experience, to make these assessments, both
in their completeness and complexity.
Is it perhaps the notion of complexity that causes courts and
society to shun mental illness? Is it that "it is in a too hard bas-
ket" that causes our desire not to consider it at all? We would
assert that a better reason is needed in this age.
A. INTRODUCING DEFINITIONS-SYMPTOMS, SIGNS,
INVESTIGATIONS, PATHOLOGY, AND DIAGNOSES
The place of mental injury (and illness) in the schema of
more general illness needs further examination, and certain ter-
minology, methodologies, and approaches must be understood
as background to the subsequent discussion. These are
presented to assist understanding.
240 JOHN DAVIES, A MANUAL OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN GENERAL PRACTICE
(rev. ed. 2003).
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In the process of diagnosis, that is, the assigning of causation
to a patient's malady, a multi-phased process occurs. 241 First, a
history of the illness is taken, in which the patient relates his
subjective narrative of the sources of discomfort and the events
leading up to them. 42 For example,
I have noticed a swelling in the neck which has been present and
growing for two months. At the same time my vision has become
blurred, and looking in the mirror I notice my eyes have a "pop-
eyed" look to them. I have a tremor, and I sweat much more
than I used to.
The practitioner may supplement these with questions that may
be relevant-for example, have you noticed any change in your
voice? Or, do you feel unduly nervy or anxious? These consti-
tute the patient's symptoms-what the patient recounts of what
he has noticed. The practitioner supplements these with appro-
priate questioning in order to obtain the history of the illness.243
Second, the practitioner examines the patient and detects as-
pects of the malady using his244 examining skill.245 For example,
he may find a fast pulse, high blood pressure, brisk reflexes, and
so on. These are signs the patient demonstrates to the
practitioner.
At this stage the practitioner will formulate a differential diag-
nosis-a set of possible causes for the symptoms and signs.246 In
the above example, thyrotoxicosis (from non-malignant causes)
is the prime on the differential, but also thyroid cancer, pituitary
adenoma, pituitary carcinoma, ectopic autonomous thyroid tis-
sue, as well as anxiety, will also figure on the differential.
Third, investigation will be undertaken to confirm or deny the
differential. 247 In the above, measurement of thyroid chemistry
on blood test is warranted, along with measurement of pituitary
chemistry and measurement of thyroid and pituitary antibody
levels. Ultrasound scan of the thyroid and possibly CT or MRI
scan of the thyroid and the pituitary would be warranted. Each
241 CLINICAL METHOD: A GENERAL PRACTICE APPROACH (Robin C. Fraser ed.,
Butterworth-Heinemann 2d ed. 1990).
242 Id. at 42.
243 Id. at 43.
244 In this text the masculine is often used. In no way is this used to deny the
feminine. It is simply used for convenient expression and should not be inter-
preted as containing any other overtone.
245 Id. at 42.
246 Id. at 44.
247 Id. at 54.
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of these gives specific results, narrowing the range of possible
differential diagnoses. Biopsy, that is the removal of a small por-
tion of tissue for microscopic examination, may also be useful.
A working diagnosis is obtained when the diagnosis is narrowed to
a minimal set of possibilities and the most likely is chosen. The
terms "minimal set" and "most likely" are used deliberately, em-
phasizing that the end of a diagnostic process at best produces a
likelihood and not a certainty, however good it is hoped that
likelihood will be. Perhaps the law is slow to understand this
essential inexactness of the medical process.
It is truly said that our ability to determine the basic cause of a
disease is fundamentally limited by the advancement and preci-
sion of our investigative modalities, as well as the advances in
research that allow our understanding of the fundamental path
of an illness, and therefore our understanding of what ought to
be investigated. This is of fundamental importance, and this ar-
ticle will allude to it later. A ready example is given by consider-
ing our understanding of schizophrenia. At one stage it was
simply regarded as a "purely" mental illness where sensory per-
ception was disordered and bizarre, and therefore some form of
"major" tranquillizer was needed. Some thought was given to
this as a "learned" response in the past. Now we have much
finer instruments at our disposal, and matters such as sensitivity
to brain chemicals like dopamine in certain brain functional re-
gions, neuronal disorganization, among many other factors, are
readily recognized. This takes such an illness out of the realm of
a purely "odd behavior" syndrome to a syndrome with definite
chemical (and physical) basis. Similar views of depression, anxi-
ety, post traumatic stress disorder, and so on, are becoming in-
creasingly more exact as these processes become better
understood.
Investigation will allow much more precise ascription of the
disease process involved and the pathological basis of the illness.
Pathology is the study of the disease itself, and it allows the under-
lying mechanism to be ascribed and specific appropriate treat-
ment to be tailored. For example, in the above case of
thyrotoxicosis, is it due to the disorder one of hormone excess
or malfunction, or is it due to an antibody process, or a malig-
nant process such as a cancer, or is it perhaps due to an infective
process like tuberculosis (TB)? Investigation, together with
symptoms and signs, allows the identification of the appropriate
pathology, and from this prediction of the likely course of the
illness can be made as well as the best based treatment.
[76
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Putting all these together allows the reaching of a diagnosis,
that is, a definition of the disease and a prediction of its likely
course together with a firm basis for intervention in this course.
It thus allows the recommendation of treatment strategies based
on good science. It must still be firmly understood, nonetheless,
that diagnosis still ascribes a cause within a degree of
probability. The confidence may be very high, but it still re-
mains a probability.
On these bases treatment is offered, whether it is by medical
intervention (often pharmacological (functional) treatment) or
by surgical intervention (structural alteration). Psychiatric treat-
ment (in many different forms) may also be offered for some
aspects-for example, the anxiety of thyrotoxicosis.
Importantly, treatment ultimately must also be seen as part of
the diagnostic process, for the diagnosis may well be modified as
the response to treatment is observed. Many medical practition-
ers who find themselves "in court" become annoyed by what is
seen as the failure of the legal process to appreciate this fact,
instead regarding diagnosis as firm and decided and the process
rigorous and deterministic, where an elected treatment that is
later modified is the "wrong treatment."
B. THE NOTION OF "MENTAL" ILLNESS
Psychiatry as a medical discipline is a young one. If one asked
the man in the street who fathered the discipline, the answer
would almost certainly be "Freud." If the man in the street
knew, he would state that Freud lived at the turn of the 19-20th
centuries.
In fact, it was a mentor of Freud, Josef Breuer, who first used
"the Talking Treatment" and influenced Freud as to its value. 248
The early history of the discipline is the subject of a fascinating
novel where Breuer enters into a fictional psychoanalysis with
the famous philosopher Friedreich Nietzsche. 249 The cover tan-
talizingly states:
So begins an intriguing battle of wills and intellect as Breuer sets
out to unlock the mysteries of a tormented mind. As the story
unfolds, we see a relationship begotten in duplicity and manipu-
lation evolve into a friendship that becomes powerfully redemp-
tive for both men. Yalom brings to life not only Nietzche and
248 IRVIN D. YALOM, WHEN NIETZCHE WEPT 303-04 (Harper Collins 1992).
249 Id. at 49.
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Breuer but also "Anna 0." and a young medical intern named
Sigmund Freud.25°
Indeed, Breuer at one stage even abandoned the treatment-
such was his disillusion with it and his uncertainty about it.
251
Nonetheless, the influence of Freud on psychiatry, while strong,
is now regarded as dated-even in his and Breuer's foundation
school of psychoanalysis.25 2 Newer schools have developed, im-
portantly embracing the behaviorists and the biological theo-
rists, though true analytical psychiatry still has its place.
In the example of thyrotoxicosis given above one is dealing
with relatively physical illness and there is little difficulty in iden-
tifying a target organ as being the site of the pathology. Psychia-
try deals with no less real, though infinitely more complex,
targets. It deals particularly with disorders of the "mind," that is
it deals with mental disorders. Human beings are complex. The
wholeness of the individual can be appreciated from several
viewpoints, including the physical, mental, social, and spiritual.
Deficiency in one will detrimentally affect the function of the
whole being. Psychiatry examines the interaction of the mind
with other parts of the human being-and conversely other
parts of the being interacting with the mind.
The process of diagnosis, however, is somewhat similar-his-
tory, examination, investigation, psychopathology and physical
pathology, diagnosis, and treatment. It is simply that the "sub-
strate" for elucidation is different but the flipside of the same
coin. Certain background considerations may make this clearer.
The question of what exactly constitutes "the mind" has been
tacitly ignored. The answer to this question may be theological,
philosophical, and social, as well as physiological or biochemi-
cal, emphasizing that one entity can be viewed in many differ-
ent, though still valid, ways. It constitutes one of the great
philosophical debates of psychiatry253 -that of the mind-brain
duality-though many now regard it is an equivalent argument
to numbers of angels dancing on pin-heads.
An analogy might be considered by examining a book. At
one level, the book is made of paper. On the paper are words.
250 Id. (on cover).
251 See generally id.
252 Patricia Cohen, Freud Is Widely Taught at Universities, Except in the Psychology
Department, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 23295373.
253 See TEXTBOOK OF BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1 (Jaak Panksepp ed., Wiley &
Sons, Inc. 2004).
2011] PSYCHIATRIC INJURY INAVIATIONACC1DENTS 45
The words constitute sentences. And yet coupled somehow with
this book is a story. The story has a life and being all of its own. Is
the story contained in the book? Are the book-its paper,
words, and sentences-and the story one and the same? They
are obviously connected, but how? What is the life context of
each?
Similarly, we know that the mind is somehow connected with
the brain. Certainly some pathologies of the brain present with
"mental" symptoms. In addition, some drug treatments given
for "mental" symptoms have demonstrable and measurable ac-
tions within the physical locus of the brain. And yet the duality
is not one to one. The mind in many ways has a life of its own-
just as the story has its own being beyond the words of the book.
The biological school of psychiatry would have it that much
mental symptomatology, and therefore mental illness, results
from disordered and measurable brain function-in conse-
quence, our ability to recognize this is only limited by our mea-
surement ability. 254 While the process of learning may be
important in shaping our mental processes, the very basis of
learning must have physical consequences in the brain. What
constitutes learning and therefore memory is a hugely fertile
area of psychological research and at present is only glimpsed
rather than known. Thence the effect of learned experience on
subsequent function, especially in the context of traumatic ex-
perience, takes on a new and physical meaning.
At present we leave aside these more philosophical questions
as well as others, such as: What is a mental illness? What is nor-
mality? Is it defined by a society? Is it defined by an individual?
By a doctor? What of that which is "normal" in one culture but
not another? In any case, these questions do not affect the prin-
ciple that external events have substantial influences on mental
function, and it is only a tiny step to say this applies as much to
normal function as it does to injured function (this latter being
expanded later).
Psychiatry is classically thought to involve three major subdivi-
sions-psychotic illness, neurotic illness, and personality
disorders.255
254 See id.
255 See generally DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(Am. Psychiatric Ass'n 4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM].
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Psychotic illness is said to exist where an individual loses contact
with, and the ability to test, reality.256 Thought processes are
disordered and lead to behaviors that are to some degree "bi-
zarre" and arise out of the aberrant thought structure and aber-
rant perception of reality. An example is the group of illnesses
constituting the schizophrenias, where thought processes are
disturbed by hallucinatory and delusional states distorting a per-
ception of reality, with disordered reasoning and processing and
belief systems based on faulty perceptions, leading to abnormal
behavior.257
Neurotic illness is said to exist where thought processes and
thought content are abnormal, but in such a way that maintains
contact with reality, however it may be misinterpreted rather
than wrongly conceived.258 There are many types of neurotic
illness. Examples include anxiety disorders and depressive dis-
orders, of which depression is part of the subgroup of "mood"
disorders.259 The implication that there is a distinct demarca-
tion between neurotic and psychotic illness is sufficient for our
purposes here, but not always as clear as one would wish.
Personality disorders are regarded as notoriously difficult to
treat and address the somewhat fundamental personality struc-
ture of the individual.260 The psychopathic personality may be
regarded as an example, where the individual is constitutionally
unable to feel remorse for the consequences of his actions.26'
Not surprisingly, dangerous criminal and recidivist behavior
may result.
The subdivision of mental illness into "organic" vs. "func-
tional" illnesses is now somewhat historical and was used before
finer techniques of investigation were available. Historically, on
one hand, mental symptoms were known to occur when there
were distinct diseases of the nerve structures within the brain,
for example, brain tumors. Interestingly, the symptoms that
were elicited helped to determine the function of various parts
of the brain, though now we know this is simplistic, as "localiza-
256 See id. at 197.
257 See id.
258 See A.C.P. Sims, Neurotic Illness: Conserving a Threatened Concept, 19 BRAT. J.
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 95, 95-105 (1985).
259 See DSM, supra note 255, at 345, 429.
260 See id. at 685.
261 See id. at 701-02.
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tion of function" is not as possible as one might have hoped.2 6 2
For example, destruction of a frontal lobe led to disinhibition
and loss of foresight (as the case of Phineas Gage illustrated) 2 3
with personality change. Destruction of an occipital lobe led to
sight abnormalities of particular sorts, and so on. Such symp-
toms were said to result from "organic" brain disturbances. Fur-
ther examples include the toxic neuropathies, where ingested
chemicals, either accidentally or purposely ingested for the ef-
fect, gave rise to chemical effects of a very physical kind. Ongo-
ing consequences of chronic ingestion were also identified, such
as the alcoholic syndromes of Wernickes or Korakoffs syn-
dromes. 264 These mental abnormalities are engendered by de-
monstrably physical processes. In the limited thinking of past
days, illness that could not be associated with particular physical
processes was regarded as "functional." In that category depres-
sion in its various forms was included, as was schizophrenia, and
the like.
In reality, this meant that investigative modalities were neither
fine enough nor sensitive enough. Now the distinction between
functional and organic illness is very blurred, if non-existent.
Further, subsequent knowledge has indicated past treatments
for functional illness have very distinct chemical action on cere-
bral nervous tissue, for example the increase in monoamines
seen by giving anti-depressants. 2 5 Further pathological ad-
vances have indicated that interfering with brain chemistry, for
example reducing monoamine levels, leads to predictable emer-
gence of psychiatric symptoms, such as depression.
Thus, it is asserted that the association of psychiatric symp-
tomatology and physical causation are only limited by our inves-
tigative ability, and that the distinction between psychiatric
illness and physical illness is very blurred, if not quite unrealistic.
It is the astute practitioner who takes all these elements into ac-
count in assessing and treating an illness or injury. Indeed, it
262 Localization of function is the association of particular functions of the
brain, like memory and volition and the like, with certain specific anatomical
areas of the brain. See generally, C.G. Phillips et al., Localization of Function in the
Cerebral Cortex: Past, Present and Future, 107 BRAIN 328 (1984).
263 JOEL DAVIS, MAPPING THE MIND: THE SECRETS OF THE HUMAN BRAIN AND
How IT WoRKs 228-30 (Birch Lane Press 1997).
264 HARRSON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 2496 (Eugene Braunvald et
al. eds., McGraw Hill 15th ed. 2001).
265 Trevor R. Norman, The New Antidepressants - Mechanisms of Action, 22 Aus-
TRALIAN PRESCRIBER 106, 106-08 (1999).
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has been noted that of all symptoms, psychiatric symptoms are
often the most disabling and distressing.2 66
1. Illness Versus Injury
In examining pathologies afflicting various parts of the body,
not excluding the mind, every medical student has a small litany
that must be recited, and this is the categories of causation of
pathologies giving rise to diseases. 2 67 These include recognized
illness categories, such as "immune," "ischaemic," "hypoxic,"
"neoplastic," and so on. The full categorization can be thought
of as an aid to categorizing mediators of illness in the body.
One category is that of "trauma," recognizing that the action of
external agents can cause injury to any part of the body, not
excluding the mind. Rather than causing "illness," such agen-
cies can be thought of as causing "injury," though indeed this is
simply another category of cause of body disorder.
The argument being proposed thus is that it is not possible to
separate physical and psychiatric illness. This leads to the view
that in the handling of cases of psychiatric injury, specifically in
this context of aviation injury, separation of psychiatric conse-
quences of injury from physical consequences of injury is an arti-
ficial distinction of no merit.
C. PHYSICAL CHANGES IN MENTAL DISORDERS
1. Two Major Areas-Chemical Changes and Changes in Neuronal
Connections
It is well to expand the principles above by providing exam-
ples of recent research illustrating the organic parallels between
the physical and the mental that have also blurred the distinc-
tion between the two. In so doing, two areas (at least) of physi-
cal dysfunction in the nervous system are identified. Later
discussion will indicate that these are prime loci for physical
change underlying psychiatric symptomatology. The two major
areas are those of the physical function of individual nerve cells
and the connections that they make with each other; that is the
influences one has on the next in a fashion analogous to an
electric circuit.
266 See Mary A. Cooper, M.D., Univ. of Ill. at Chicago, Address at NWA Annual
Meeting: Disability, Not Death, Is the Main Issue with Lightning Injury (Oct.
1998).
267 E.g., CLINICAL METHOD, supra note 241, at 26.
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A brief appreciation of nervous system function is useful in
defining terminology to be used, as well as appreciating the un-
derlying organicity of all neural functions. It is acknowledged in
passing that the biological school of psychiatric thought sees
mental function as arising from cellular neural functions,
hence, the school accepts the view that mental function can be
traced to cellular function, either normal or abnormal.
Neuronal Considerations.268 All tissues, not least brain tissues,
are composed of individual cells. The fundamental cell of neu-
ral activity is the neuron(e). Such a cell has the usual body con-
taining a nucleus as well as many different subcellular bodies,
which subsume the various metabolic and reproductive actions
of the cell. A major difference is that the neuron has a long
projection, termed an axon, along which electrical impulses may
pass. Once an electrical impulse passes along an axon, the im-
pulse reaches the terminus of the axon, perhaps several tens of
centimeters from the cell body. At the end of the axon, in re-
sponse to the impulse, the terminal of the axon releases a chem-
ical. The terminal of the axon is placed in close proximity to a
further neuron body. The released chemical, termed a neuro-
transmitter, crosses a very small cleft, termed the synaptic cleft, to
act on the subsequent cell membrane. The action on the subse-
quent cell membrane initiates an electrical impulse in that cell.
Cellular transmission and communication thus occurs via the ac-
tion of neurotransmitters.
The neurotransmitter is released into the synaptic cleft from
the presynaptic membrane to have action on the postsynaptic mem-
brane.269 Action of the neurotransmitter is terminated by its
breakdown by one of several chemical mechanisms-perhaps by
direct chemical action in the cleft, perhaps by uptake back into
the presynaptic cell terminal. Matters become far more compli-
cated when it is realized that the neurotransmitter can act not
only on the postsynaptic membrane, but perhaps also on the
presynaptic membrane, modifying the behavior of the transmis-
sion. Further, some actions on the postsynaptic membrane may
simply modify its behavior rather than initiate the onward elec-
trical impulse. The action of a neurotransmitter on a cell mem-
brane takes place at a receptor, which may be considered as a
268 See JOHN G. NICHOLLS ET AL., FROM NEURON TO BRIIN (Sinauer Assocs. 3d
ed. 1992) (providing a complex exposition of the principles of neuronal activity).
269 Id. at 19-21.
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specific lock that is undone by the particular neurotransmitter
to perform a specific function.
The whole communication unit is termed a synapse, and the
process of transmission between one cell and the next is the pro-
cess of one cell synapsing with the next.27 0 Multiple axons may
synapse with any one cell body and synapses may either promote
or retard subsequent transmission. Thus the neuronal cell be-
comes an integrative station for most complex transmission.
Groups of cells may be aggregated into ganglia (s. ganglion),
which are somewhat ill defined; however, they can be consid-
ered aggregations of cells of similar and/or integrative func-
tion.271 Various regions of the brain have been found to contain
neurons of similar function,272 though the holy grail of localiz-
ing certain functions to specific cerebral areas now would seem
an impossibility.
Connections and Circuit Consideration.273 A second and ex-
tremely complex aspect of neural function revolves around the
connections into complex circuitous paths of neural synaptic
communications. Thus, complex actions can be achieved by
multiple synaptic activations. For example, a muscle movement
may be initiated from a particular group of neural cells, with
impulses being passed to the required muscles. This "motor
cortex" is located in an area of the brain behind the frontal
lobes. But in the process of neural excitation, before the im-
pulse reaches the desired muscle, multiple other processes are
integrated-for example, the initiation of the movement, the
control of firing of the pathway so that the movement is smooth
and not jerky, the original position of the muscles versus the
final desired position, and so on. A seemingly simple action
(culminating in an observed result like the movement of a mus-
cle) results from many highly complex integrated actions. Vari-
ous areas of the brain contain neuronal focuses for various parts
of these actions to a greater or lesser degree. The motor cortex
when stimulated can cause a movement to occur. The basal
270 Id. at 2.
271 Id. at 21.
272 Knowledge of these regions of localization comes, in part, from study of
pathological processes and/or injuries affecting local parts of the brain. Simi-
larly, the action of medications affecting specific neurons gives inferential clues
as to the functions of certain brain regions. Localization, however, is imperfect
and not amenable to simple local identification, with some functions being
spread widely in the brain. See id. at 2.
273 Id. at 9.
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ganglia (a complex group of structures internal to the brain)
control the initiation and coordination of the action. The cere-
bellum (a low posterior structure) controls the jerkiness/
smoothness of the action. And so on.
At this stage, however, one question has been bypassed-what
initiates this process in the motor cortex? Equally, functions
other than pure motor function may be recognized by analogy.
These include vision and hearing, where some elements of the
brain respond to very specific impulsive stimuli resulting from
pinpoints of light stimulating the eyes and/or ears. Some areas
respond to these primal stimuli, other areas integrate these and
"associate" them into the more complex entities of scenes or pic-
tures. The examination of these functions has been the subject
of immense research, but apart from acknowledging its exis-
tence, the detail is beyond the present scope.
In the present context, even more complex and ill-under-
stood processes subsume the "mental" functions of memory,
thought, sensory appreciation, emotion, moods, learning, and
so on. Yet, to return to the previous observation, a set of im-
pulses generated from neural elements connected in neural cir-
cuits have multiple consequences of an emotional kind-the
evoking of emotions, the raising of memories, the setting of
mood. This, then, begins to answer the question of how to initi-
ate a movement-by desire, perhaps-by impingement of im-
pulses of emotional origin on the motor cortex.
Some actions within the individual take place unconsciously.
Examples include the control of heart rate, sweating, blood
pressure, and so on. Yet these are ultimately mediated by inte-
grated neuronal action within pathways generating the uncon-
scious control signals. The generation of such unconscious
responses in consequence of mental processes (heart rate,
sweating, tremor, and so on, for example) reinforces the idea
that underlying emotional responses can control what might in-
clude physically consequent manifestations. It may very well be
that the circuitry required has been laid down by a learning pro-
cess (Joel Davis suggests innate hardwired circuitry at birth al-
lows us to perform genetically advantageous tasks such as
suckling, grasping, etc., and subsequent learning has been
shown to increase neural connections by orders of magni-
tude) .274 Actions and emotions result from learned processes,
via laid-down circuitry. It is highly likely, therefore, that learn-
274 DAVIS, supra note 263, at 28-29.
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ing can be stimulated by a traumatic event, and that this trau-
matic learning can shape future responses.275
Further, in their simplest forms, the consequences of mental
processes can only deliver any response by the very physical acti-
vation of neuronal activation. Thus, no physically observable ac-
tivity takes place without very physical neuronal synaptic activity,
which may be just as much triggered by mental (e.g., a thought,
or a mood) as well as physical processes (like the perception of
pain). In this way, any body behavior is "physical" by definition.
Psychopathology. It is readily appreciated that there are several
processes that can lead to "abnormal" function of the nervous
system, including abnormalities in mental function. It has al-
ready been asserted that no function, mental or physical, con-
scious or unconscious, can take place without physical synaptic
action. Indeed, in one sense there is no actual "abnormality" as
such, merely consequential neurological function, mental or
physical, that our society has chosen to label "abnormal."
In a pathway, several potential sites for abnormal function can
be identified. The neurotransmitter may be faulty, either in
structure or quantity. The means of receptor action may be im-
perfect. The electrical impulse may be imperfectly transmitted.
In the wider context, neuronal connections may be improperly
constructed, leading to improper integration of function.
Mental disorders corresponding to all of these possibilities have
been identified.
While the former neuronal level function abnormalities are
thought to underpin many abnormalities like depression, bipo-
lar disorder, anxiety, schizophrenia, and the like, the latter is
also particularly important in our context. The growth and es-
tablishment of neural connections may be considered to be a
result of the normal learning process as above, and this is part of
normal cerebral growth and development, even schooling.276
But traumatic experiences may well induce learned neural
connections. The place of traumatic experiences in the modifi-
cation of neural connections leading to abnormal learned emo-
tional responses-for example PTSD-is widely accepted. 2
77
This is simply now a physical process underlying what was once
seen as functional illness. Even then, it is well established that
environmental events can also influence neurotransmitter
275 See TEXTBOOK OF BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY, supra note 253, at 321.
276 DAvis, supra note 263, at 33.
277 TEXTBOOK OF BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY, supra note 253, at 325.
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levels, and in turn this underlies some mental disorders, such as
depression.278 It is further noted that the ability to research
such processes is dependent on the ability to examine neural
tissue in sufficiently fine detail.
Breuer, Freud, and colleagues may well have regarded psycho-
logical treatments as addressing only one group of maladies,
those of the mind, and regarded their endeavors as establishing a
unique and new branch of medicine. But, this is now seen as far
from the truth. There can never be a division between psyche
and soma, between physical and mental, for there is no portion
of either that is not informed by the other.
Several examples of hitherto functional illness assist in illus-
trating this physicality. 279 These illnesses/injuries are those
likely to be seen in cases of aviation induced mental injury.
While this discussion cannot be exhaustive, the interested
reader is referred to more comprehensive references (e.g., Jank
Panksepp).280 While several illnesses are mentioned, in the con-
text of this article, PTSD is salutary and coincidentally an illness
where much current work is progressing. This relevant work
may be taken as a model below.
An important note here is that environmental factors can also
produce mental illness, and experiences can alter brain struc-
ture and function.2 s l In the present context this is an important
note as it leads us directly to the point that external injuring
forces can alter brain structure and function (and not only
brain), giving rise to mental symptoms and illness. The reduc-
tion in mono-amines as above due to external stress is known,
the production of post traumatic stress is known, panic attacks
are known, the increase in cortico-tropin-releasing factor (CRF)
is known, and the connection of CRF with depression has been
proposed.28 2 In the context of this article, these observations
are important and highly relevant.
278 Id. at 324.
279 See generally id.
280 See generally id.
281 See id. at 201.
282 See Charles Nemeroff, The Corticotrophin Releasing Factor (CRF) Hypothesis of
Depression: New Findings and New Directions, 1 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 336, 336-42
(1996); see generally TEXTBOOK OF BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY, supra note 253.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN COMMERCE
D. RECENT RESEARCH IN PTSD AND CONGENERS-
A PROTOTYPE
It is well known that as well as the mood disorder and other
associated dysfunction that can exist in the depressive spectrum
of diseases, other highly relevant associated syndromes can exist,
for example, phobias, panic, and post traumatic-like syn-
dromes.28 3 Recent research in PTSD links the biochemical find-
ings in each of these disorders and provides a prototypical
example for this article of organically based illness which has
only recently been observed and recognized. 2 4
The link with environmental stressors is profound. When sub-
ject to severe stressors, individuals release a steroid hormone,
cortisol. This is released under the control of the hypothala-
mus, a specific region of the brain. This stimulates the pituitary
gland, a specific endocrine gland, and this in turn causes release
of cortisol from the adrenal gland. The hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenal axis is clearly implicated in stress response, and the psy-
chological consequences are becoming measurable and
observable.
Rachel Yehuda provides an insight into hormonal alterations
in PTSD. Yehuda notes a very complex literature with regards to
cortisol levels in PTSD. 28 5 The general view is that cortisol levels
are lowered in PTSD, and she points out that they are statisti-
cally significantly lowered compared to comparison populations
even though they may often appear in the normal range.28 6 Low
cortisol levels in PTSD patients are seen despite the fact that the
controlling hormone CRF is raised. This raises the possibility of
another theory regarding neural responsiveness to CRF in
PTSD, and that is alterations in the responsiveness of cortisol
sensors in the disorder. A typical test for the integrity of the
HPA pathway is the dexamethasone suppression test. Adminis-
tration of dexamethasone, being a potent cortisol analogue,
suppresses ACTH and CRF production in the normally function-
ing system. Yehuda states the fact that the dexamethasone sup-
pression test in PTSD is in fact abnormal.28 7 It demonstrates
increased cortisol suppression after dexamethasone administra-
283 DSM, supra note 255, at 429.
2s4 Rachel Yehuda, Psychobiology of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Decade of Pro-
gress 1071 ANNALS N.Y. Am. AcAD. Scl. 137-38 (2006).
285 See id. at 139.
286 Id.
287 See id.
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tion. Her focus therefore is on disorders in the control system for
cortisol secretion mediated via the CRF receptor.28 8
The technicalities of the argument are not of immediate in-
terest, but simply demonstrate that strong inroads are being
made into the physical basis for highly relevant consequences of
stressful events.
Cortisol is also under investigation in related disorders, in-
cluding "pure depression" where, as well as a monoamine theory
of depression exists, the role of cortisol is postulated. 2 9 Thus,
cortisol is connected to two disorders closely allied to psycholog-
ical manifestations of aviation injury. PTSD alone is argued in
many cases, but the related disorders, anxiety, panic, and de-
pression, are also strongly prevalent, and are unified in the the-
ory involving the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis.
We turn to other theories of these diseases, illustrating that
the finding of physicality is certainly not of recent origin and has
a time-honored place in medical science.
1. Depression and Mood Disorder
Despite common misconception, "depression" is an illness
that has many more features than just "feeling blue. ' 290 It also
includes features such as abnormal sleep pattern, changes in ap-
petite and body weight, motor and mental speed, fatigue and
energy loss, loss of concentration, apathy, feelings of worthless-
ness and guilt, and recurrent thoughts of death, with or without
suicide attempts. 291 Studies identify many fundamental chemi-
cal imbalances within this syndrome, made more complex by
the recognition of not just one form, but many forms, of depres-
sion.29 2  This may indicate multiple potential causative
problems, and the search for only one causative lesion is elusive.
Genetic associations with abnormalities in the transport pro-
teins for serotonin seem promising.293 Such a genetic influence
points fundamentally to an inheritable biochemical deficiency.
Dysregulation of various chemical pathways involving specific
neuropeptides and neurochemicals is also strongly implicated,
and pathways connecting various key parts of the brain are also
288 See id. at 154-55.
289 See id. at 147.
290 DSM, supra note 255, at 352.
291 Id. at 349.
292 Id. at 353.
293 Id.
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implicated.294 This specifically includes the limbic system, hip-
pocampus, hypothalamus, and frontal cortices, which are all ar-
eas of quite significant activity in response to emotional stimuli
operating at a level not in immediate consciousness.
Various causes of dysregulation are proposed-HPA function
via CRF, 95 allied with abnormalities in dexamethasone suppres-
sion testing. Panksepp interestingly cites Christine Heim et
al.,296 as finding "reports of alterations in cortisol regulation in
women with a history of early life trauma or abuse further sug-
gest that HPA axis dysregulation may be an important marker of
vulnerability to various types of affective disorders in later life
"297
Other reports indicate that regionally specific localized brain
deficiencies can underpin prominence of various of the cogni-
tive deficits and later associations with other brain disorders
such as Parkinson's Disease and the dementias. 29 ' Deficiencies
in serotonin and noradrenaline have long been considered to
underlie various depressions, and this observation is linked with
the therapeutic effect of medication for depression on increas-
ing these neurotransmitter levels in the synapse. 299 The studies
are well supported by post mortem assays of the chemicals, as
well as measurements of the activity of the serotonin receptor
binding capabilities which are altered in depression. 00
The findings above point to substantial chemical abnormali-
ties in depression. Structural abnormalities are also supported
by a long list of associations between known destructive lesions
(ranging from tumors, dementias, metabolic diseases, and so
on) with depressions. A detailed discussion of the biological un-
derpinning of depression is somewhat beyond the present
scope, but the observations made thus far should leave the
reader in no doubt that multiple changes in brain chemistry and
connection are strongly linked to depression.
294 Id.
295 See Nemeroff, supra note 282, at 336.
296 Christine Heim et al., Pituitary-Adrenal and Autonomic Responses to Stress in
Women After Sexual and Physical Abuse in Childhood, 284JAMA 592, 592-97 (2000).
297 TEXThOOK OF BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY, supra note 253, at 204.
298 Id. at 471-72.
299 Id. at 206-07.
300 Id. at 207.
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2. Schizophrenia
The schizophrenias are a complex group of illnesses and are
characterized by varying combinations of hallucinations, delu-
sions, disorganization of motor functions like speech, thought
processes, and logic, with loss of affect and volition." 1 There
must be associated occupational and social dysfunction, to-
gether with an absence of other diagnoses (such as drug abuse)
to account for the disorder.0 2 There is some genetic heritability
of the disorder, though not simple, and various cerebral ana-
tomical alterations have been demonstrated. These point to an
underlying physical basis to the disease. At the microscopic
level, alterations of synaptic connectivity are demonstrated, es-
pecially in the neocortex and hippocampus. Disorder in the
normal layering of neuronal cells has also been described.
Changes in regional cerebral activity have been demonstrated
on imaging.
The anatomical disturbances that have been demonstrated
provide an example of derangement of overall brain function,
and in line with the second mechanism postulated, chemical ab-
normalities also exist, especially with regard to dopamine func-
tion, along with other neurotransmitters. Nonetheless, where
the chemistry was considered in the past to be the main abnor-
mality in schizophrenia, the parts played by the two aspects,
chemical and connectivity, are now closely intertwined.
3. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
Of all psychiatric injuries most likely to present themselves fol-
lowing an accident, PTSD must figure as one of the most likely
and its use as a prototype has been set out above. As Panksepp
puts it, " [t] he human response to psychological trauma is one of
the most important public health problems in the world."30
Further,
The biology of routine stress responses and the biology of trauma
are fundamentally different: Stress causes a cascade of biological
and physiological changes that return to normal after the stress is
gone .... In contrast, in PTSD, the biological alterations persist
well after the stressor itself has disappeared. The fundamental
problem in PTSD is a "fixation of the trauma." Thus, the critical
issue in understanding PTSD is: What keeps the organism from
301 DSM, supra note 255, at 299.
302 Id. at 298.
303 TEXTBOOK OF BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY, supa note 253, at 319.
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maintaining its homeostasis and returning to its nontraumatic
state, and what causes these regulatory processes to break
down?30 4
Further, the process involves "alterations in a variety of 'filter-
ing' systems in the central nervous system (CNS) that help
distinguish relevant from irrelevant stimuli. As a result, trauma-
tized individuals have difficulty engaging fully in current exigen-
cies and distinguishing between what is threatening and what is
safe. '"305
The elements of PTSD are summarized as repeated reliving of
memories from the traumatic experience, emotional numbing
and avoidance behaviors, and patterns of hyperarousal.
Panksepp quotes McLean, who defined the brain as a mecha-
nism for "detecting, amplifying, and analyzing" in order to
maintain an "internal and external environment. 30 6 This
ranges from fundamental unconscious activities like the control
of oxygen intake and temperature maintenance, through to the
categorization of incoming information against which to make
long term complex decisions regarding the self and society.30 7
He proposed three levels of brain development which are repre-
sented in the evolutionary structures seen in the human brain:
"(1) the brainstem and hypothalamus, which are primarily asso-
ciated with the regulation of internal homeostasis; (2) the lim-
bic system, which maintains the balance between the internal
world and external reality; and (3) the neocortex, which is re-
sponsible for analyzing and interacting with the external
world. '3 0 8 The first contains the most stable circuitry, the third
contains circuitry modifiable by experience, and the second is
transitional between the two.30 9 Thus, it might be thought that
trauma might most profoundly affect the neocortex 1 ° While
this seems true for the stress response, trauma (defined as stress
which overwhelms the organism) seems to affect the lower core
functions. 11 Panksepp goes on to say that "[fWailure to compre-
hend the traumatizing experience... plays a critical role in mak-
304 Id. at 321 (internal citations omitted).
305 Id.
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ing a stressful experience traumatic. 12 This type of inability lays
the foundation for a distorted picture of danger and its interpre-
tation that underlies PTSD.
It goes without saying that in itself a traumatic experience in
an aviation context must rank as one well outside a normal ex-
perience, and therefore it has an incomprehensible quality to
start with.
Biological underpinning has been sought for this inability.31
Several factors are noted: (1) medication that increases arousal
also increases the relived trauma response, and the opposite
with modalities that decrease arousal; (2) an abnormal startle
response is thought to be grounded in permanent neuronal
changes that have negative effects on learning, habituation, and
stimulus discrimination; (3) loss of regulation of the arousal
mechanisms is at the brainstem level; and (4) over-reactivity of
stress hormone responses, such that less and less stimulus is re-
quired to produce the same hormone response. 14 The topic is
far reaching, and a brief discussion like this only begins to out-
line the many factors in these disorders; however, it underlines
their strong physicality.
A highly relevant contention in this context is that external
processes exert a substantial effect on psychological function.
The adaptation of an organism to repeated stressful stimuli is
noteworthy. In the context of PTSD, for example, lesser and
lesser stimulus is needed to invoke the same trauma response in
the reliving. In depression, an environmental trigger is often
noted in initial attacks, but less and less in subsequent attacks.
The chemical adaptation of the organism is easily seen to under-
lie both.
A further noteworthy feature of environmental influences on
psychological function is that somatic therapies (physically alter-
ing therapies) can be most successful in treating some disorders.
These range from the commonly used and very effective elec-
troconvulsive therapy (ECT) and its new cousin, magnetic
seizure therapy, and in increasing order of invasiveness, trans-
cranial magnetic stimulation, vagal nerve stimulation, deep
brain stimulation, and psychosurgery. 15
312 Id. at 325.
313 Id.
314 See id. at 326-28.
315 Id. at 522.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Finally, it is appropriate to draw attention to future prospects
in neurobiological psychiatry. The use of gene therapy and
neuropeptide medications, together with fundamental research
on delineating various subgroups of mental illnesses propor-
tional to specific neurotransmitter abnormalities in one family
of cousins, all offer possibilities for the future A'6 These are fun-
damentally predicated on their being physical and biological un-
derpinnings to psychiatric disorders.
The first endpoint of this argument is that there ought to be
no major distinction between physical and mental illness. Sec-
ond, there can be no physical or psychiatric manifestation that is
not mediated by neural activity. And third, environmental
events, such as traumatic incidents, can have consequences phys-
ically giving rise to mental disorders. These may be most simply
considered as events altering neuronal connections, and
thereby influencing learning, so that abnormalities arising from
environmental stressors can be regarded as learned responses.
On the other hand, complex chemical and hormonal conse-
quences subsume changes at the cellular level. Overall, the
point being made is that while it is fundamentally wrong to sepa-
rate physical and mental illness, even if we were to accept for the
sake of argument that a physical basis for psychological function
and malfunction is necessary for legal success, there is marked,
ongoing evidence that such physical mechanisms do exist and
are the norm.
E. JUSTIFICATION FOR A WIDER INTERPRETIVE APPROACH
It is clear that a case exists for reconsidering aviation acci-
dents giving rise to mental injury so as to allow their compen-
sability once substantiated, and this is purely on medical
grounds. On the one hand, it is artificial to consider physical
and mental illness as being fundamentally different. On the
other, if one must pursue the notion that physical causation for
psychiatric illness must be found, then there is no mental func-
tion that is not mediated by some form of neuronal activity, nor-
mal or abnormal.
Various other reasons have been given in justifying a wider
recognition in this area apart from this medically argued view.
316 See id. at 177-86, 628-32.
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Among these, Vernon Nase has provided the following
categorization.317
1. Clarification and Unification of the Law, and Bringing the Law
into Line with Parallel Law in Other Fields
At present, the outcome of a claim for pure mental injury in
fields other than aviation is precariously based on which jurisdic-
tion is hearing the claim. Unification and clarification is a mat-
ter of simple predictive justice. In this context, the authors
consider Australian law, this being the jurisdiction in which the
authors reside, noting parallels in other jurisdictions.
Tort law compensation is the focus for this examination as a
related comparative area. A jurisprudence has grown up
around the topic of recovery for psychiatric illness in tort law.
This jurisprudence has developed from the denial of compensa-
tion, through the use of the term "nervous shock" to the identi-
fication of recognizable psychiatric illness.318 This latter term will be
addressed later, however, the following indicates some of the ba-
sic principles of the development.
In Campbelltown City Council v. Mackay, Justice Kirby, stated:
Since the tort of nervous shock was fashioned, there have been
substantial advances in the understanding of human psychology.
It is highly artificial to imprison the legal cause of action for psy-
chiatric injury in an outmoded scientific view about the nature of
its origins. The causes of action at common law should .. .be
released from subservience to nineteenth century science."'
The parallels with comments, supra, regarding the imprison-
ment of aviation law in 1929 science is noted in passing. 32
Harold Luntz and David Hambly do acknowledge the diffi-
culty in distinguishing a normal grief reaction, which might be
considered to include a normal stress reaction, from that which
is prolonged and shades into a mental illness.321 This might be
considered.322 However, the U.K. Law Commission stated that
"[p] sychiatry does recognise a distinction between mere mental
317 Vernon Nase, International Aviation and the Liability for Mental Injury: Is the
Best Really an Enemy of the Good, 10 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 409, 411-12 (1999).
318 SeeJaensch v. Coffey (1984) 155 C.L.R. 549, 551-52; Tame v. New S. Wales
(2002) 211 C.L.R. 317, 329.
319 Campbelltown City Council v. Mackey (1989) 15 N.S.W.L.R. 501.
320 See supra Part I.
321 HAROLD LUNTZ & DAVID HAMBLY, TORTS: CASES AND COMMENTARY (5th rev.
ed. 2002).
322 See the discussion of PTSD, supra Part III.D.3.
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distress and psychiatric illness, although the distinction between
the two is a matter of degree rather than kind and, as medical
knowledge advances, changes over time. '"323
The Commission's report is instructive in many areas and re-
pays reading. The commissioners considered that reasonable
foreseeability of psychiatric injury should be the major criterion
of liability, not proximity of the patient.3 24 In the context they
considered, the commissioners felt that shock as a requirement
for the induction of the illness should be abandoned. 25 None-
theless, in the context of an aviation injury, some form of
trauma should be easily demonstrable in any case.
In Jaensch v. Coffey, Justice Deane not only accepted the con-
cept of psychiatric illness following trauma, but extended its
scope to include secondary persons close to the index case.3 6
The U.K. report similarly comes to this view with provisos.3 7
Gifford v. Strang Patrick Stevedoring Ltd., concurs with this view
also in contemplating psychiatric injury to a child of an em-
ployee, compensable against the negligence of the employer,
given evidence establishing a suitably close relationship. 28
Peter Handford states that in the evaluation of psychiatric in-
jury, "Australian courts have shown themselves much more pre-
pared than their counterparts in England to recognise the
existence of a duty not to cause psychiatric injury in novel
situations. ' 321
In the recent cases of Tame v. New South Wales and Annetts v.
Australian Cattle Stations, the following principles were re-af-
firmed and are taken as the definitive Australian view on psychi-
atric injury:330
1. "The common law [of Australia] does not limit liability
for damages for psychiatric injury to cases where the in-
jury is caused by a sudden shock";331
323 LAW COMM'N (U.K.), LIABILITY FOR PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS 54 (1998), available
at www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc249 (1) .pdf.
324 Id. at 12-13.
325 Id. at 11.
326 Jaensch v. Coffey (1984) 155 C.L.R. 549, 579.
327 See LAW COMM'N, supra note 323.
328 Gifford v. Strang Patrick Stevedoring Ltd. (2003) 214 C.L.R. 269, 269.
32 Peter Handford, When the Telephone Rings: Restating Negligence Liability for Psy-
chiatric Illness, 23 SYDNEY L. REv. 597, 605 (2001).
330 See Tame v. New S. Wales (2002) 211 C.L.R. 317 (decided with Annetts v.
Austi. Cattle Stations).
331 Id. at 319, 325 (per Gleeson CJ., Gaudron, Gummow, and Kirby, JJ.).
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2. The common law of Australia does not limit liability for
damages for psychiatric injury to cases "where a plaintiff
has directly perceived a distressing phenomenon or its im-
mediate aftermath";332
3. "Damages are recoverable in negligence only for a
recognisable psychiatric injury and not for emotional dis-
tress";33 3 and
4. It is not a precondition to recovery in any action for negli-
gently inflicted psychiatric harm that the plaintiff be a
person of "normal" emotional and psychological
fortitude.1 4
The view in principle number three above is highlighted. Ini-
tially, when allowing the possibility of a successful claim for
mental injury, courts invented the term "nervous shock" with its
implied focus of one event impinging directly on one individual
giving rise to a claim by that individual. 35 In developing this,
Tame and Annetts demonstrate the expansion to the use of the
term "recognisable psychiatric injury. '336 This is a fundamental
change and illustrates the necessity for the injury claimed to be
recognized (that is, known as an entity, perhaps via DSM,
though it is argued to the psychiatric profession whether a DSM
classification is needed) and be diagnosable. Even after the ma-
jor legislative intervention in the law of negligence, in the wake
of the "insurance crisis" and the Ipp Report, domestic jurisdic-
tions maintain the need to establish a "recognized psychiatric
illness. 337
This underpins the contention of the writers for the necessity
of expert psychiatric opinion in the terms outlined previously.
Where a distinction is drawn between recognizable psychiatric
injury and mere mental distress also mitigates against the flood-
gates argument. As David Ruschena notes:
By leaving open the possibility of claims by victims in a close and
loving but not necessarily family relationship with a harmed pri-
mary victim, and by following the decisions in Tame and Annetts
that "immediate perception" and "sudden shock" go to reasona-
332 Id. at 319, 323.
333 Id. at 339 (per Gaudron, Gummow, and Kirby, J.J.) (emphasis added).
334 Id. at 323 (per Gleeson C.J., Gummow, and Kirby, J.J.).
335Jaensch v. Coffey (1984) 155 C.L.R. 549, 555.
336 Tame, 211 C.L.R. at 329.
337 See, e.g., Civil Liability Act (W.A.), 2002, § 5S(1) (Austl.) (mandating that
the plaintiff must have suffered a recognized psychiatric illness for a duty of care
to be owed in negligence).
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ble foreseeability only, the Court appears to have indicated that
the scope of litigation has the potential to be much wider than
people might have otherwise assumed.338
2. Law of the Sea, Rail Conventions, and Inland Waterways
Convention
Each of these methods of transportation allow claim for psy-
chiatric injury.3 9 On this basis alone a case may be made that
air passengers ought to be allowed the same recognition.
3. A Human Rights Issue
Just as one does not discriminate against those with physical
injuries, to deny a claim for mental injury is a form of discrimi-
nation. 4 ° It has been argued above that there is no fundamen-
tal distinction between physical and mental injury and illness,
and that each influences the other.
F. THE INSEPARABILITY OF PHYSICAL AND MENTAL ILLNESS
AND INJURY
Added to these, the foregoing sections of this article have ar-
gued a further reason for the widened view, and that is that the
contemporary understanding of the nature of physical and
mental illness requires that physical and mental illness be
treated on an equivalent footing. Indeed, to separate the two is
an artificial endeavor and is fraught with illogicality, as well as
being out of step with contemporary medical understanding.
Consider the following views, for example.
The Indivisibility of Mental from Physical Health. This point de-
serves the strongest emphasis, foremost to counteract the funda-
mental misconception that leads to such language as "mental
health" or "physical problem." These very notions are errone-
ous, incomplete, and are belied by simple clinical phenomena.
One can hardly find in a primary care patient evidence of psy-
chological distress or mental symptomatology without accompa-
nying physical symptomatology. Conversely, physical-so-called
medical-problems are always accompanied by psychological
symptoms. It is impossible to render adequate primary care
338 David Ruschena, Development in Claims for Psychiatric Injury, FINDLAW.COM,
http://-wv.findlaw.com.au/article/9808.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
339 Nase, supra note 317, at 411.
340 Id. at 412.
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without attending to both.34 1 "[Plsychiatry is, and has always
been, concerned with behaviour in its widest sense, and has con-
tinually searched for knowledge of brain-behaviour relation-
ships and the somatic underpinnings of psychopathology. 3 42
Although the fields of psychosomatic medicine, behavioral
medicine, and health psychology have slightly different perspec-
tives, they share the view that health and illness result from the
interplay of biological, psychological, and social forces.
343
Using the biopsychosocial model as a guide, researchers have
discovered new and important findings and ways to promote
people's health and recovery from illness.344 Here is a sample of
discoveries:
" Using psychological methods to reduce anxiety in patients
who are awaiting surgery enables them to recover more
quickly and leave hospital sooner;
* People who have a high degree of social support from fam-
ily and friends are healthier and live longer than people
who do not;
* Stress impairs the function of the immune system; and
" Applying psychological and educational programs for can-
cer patients reduces their feelings of depression, improves
their immune system functioning, and enables them to
live longer. 45
It has already been noted that psychiatric injuries can be among
the most disabling that can be suffered and represent sources of
extreme distress to individuals. This makes the denial of com-
pensation merely a perpetuation of ill-based prejudice.
G. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ARGUMENTS AGAINST A WIDE VIEW
1. Existing Concerns
Legitimate concerns have been raised regarding the conse-
quences of increasing the access to compensation for mental in-
jury.3 4 6 It is well to acknowledge these and place them in
context. It must firmly be reiterated that the bringing of an ac-
tion and claim for mental injury will require significant expert
341 HANDBOOK OF MIND-BODY MEDICINE FOR PRIMARY CARE 84 (David Moss et al.
eds., 2003) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
342 MICHAEL R. TRIMBLE, BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 19 (2d ed. 1996).
343 See generally id.
344 HANDBOOK, supra note 341, at 86.
345 See generally TRIMBLE, supra note 342.
346 49 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Post-Traumatic Stress § 1 (1987).
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opinion. Such expert opinion will generally be psychiatric or
psychological. This requirement should not daunt the courts.
Many causes of action, not least for psychiatric injury in tort law,
depend on such opinions already. 47 Such will undoubtedly be
the case in aviation mental injury actions.
Having said this, courts know well the value of expert opinion,
and the handling of expert opinions is no surprise for them. It
has well been recognized that psychiatric experts have the ca-
pacity to form opinions on:
1. the nature of a psychiatric syndrome;
2. current research on the organicity of such;
3. the relation to a precipitating event; and
4. the degree of disability posed by a given injury. 4 8
Windeyer's famous comment that law marches with medicine
"but in the rear and limping a little" is highly relevant here.34 9
So, also is His Honour's comment that "[t]he ways in which the
law of liability for nervous shock has been developed by courts
... have been empirical, with results and limitations that appear
as pragmatical rather than as logical applications of
principle. "350
Luntz and Hambly caution that in psychiatric injury there is a
dividing line that may all too easily be crossed between what
might be regarded as a normal (grief) reaction into psychiatric
illness. 1 Justice Kirby, however, opined:
Nineteenth century notions of psychological illness and an abid-
ing suspicion of such claims (not so susceptible to objective scru-
tiny and determination) lurk in the cases to forbid recovery
where prolonged grief is shown, extending beyond the norm
deemed acceptable to our society. The changing composition of
the Australian community, and different cultural attitudes to the
demonstration of profound grief, afford yet another reason for
reconsidering this area of the law. To adhere to stereotypes ex-
pressed in terms of "abnormal grief' derived from England, may
work an injustice upon Australian litigants for whom the norms
347 See, e.g., Coates v. Gov't Ins. Office of New S. Wales, No. 40367, 1995 NSW
LEXIS 11038, at *4-8 (S. Ct. N.S.W. 1995).
348 33 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FAcTs 2D Qualifications of Medical Expert Witness § 1
(1907).
349 Mount Isa Mines Ltd. v. Pusey (1970) 125 C.L.R. 383, 395.
350 Id. at 407.
351 LUNTZ & HAMBLY, supra note 321, at 538.
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are different and grief reaction more variable than was hitherto
expressed to be the case.35 2
In this is an implicit expression that not only should the legal
process be in the van of development, but also it recognizes the
ability of psychiatrists in giving helpful and valuable expert opin-
ion: "Psychiatry does recognise a distinction between mere
mental distress and psychiatric illness, although the distinction
between the two is a matter of degree rather than kind and, as
medical knowledge advances, changes over time." '353
This highlights that, in addition, expert opinions will be re-
quired to provide guidance not only on whether a particular
malady is of sufficient degree as to warrant compensation, but
does indeed constitute mental illness.
2. Other Views
Thus, three arguments against the wider view-that there
would be an opening for (1) diagnostic difficulty, (2) scope for
abuse of the diagnosis, and (3) difficulty disproving such a
claim-seem to diminish when one accepts the ability of expert
opinion to assist as above. Even if criticism is directed at this
notion, it is criticism that is no more valid than for many other
areas of law, and there seems no justification for denying claims
in the case of aviation accidents alone. It is suggested that ex-
pert opinion will need to address specifically:
1. the diagnosis of the plaintiffs disorder, and especially
that it reaches the criteria for mental illness rather than
normal reaction (and DSM354 assists in this regard);
2. the causal relation to the stressor;
3. the underlying pathology and current research; and
4. the degree of disability posed by the illness/injury. 55
The court will need to be satisfied that a diagnosable illness has
been suffered, and that this constitutes a significant enough dis-
ability of likely longevity to merit compensation. 56
The fourth criticism, that allowance of these claims will open
the floodgates of litigation, is an argument that has been ad-
vanced regarding other areas of allowance of litigation without
352 Coates, 1995 NSW LEXIS, at *30.
353 LAw COMM'N, supra note 323, at 52.
354 DSM, supra note 255.
355 See discussion supra Part III.F.
56 Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1191-92 (D. Mont.
1999).
68 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN COMMERCE [76
real detrimental consequence.357 This argument too would
seem to be satisfied when the court is assured of the preceding
two stipulations. It is noteworthy that the U.K Law Commission
had the floodgates argument well in mind when formulating its
recommendations.3 5 8 In this regard it made two observations.
The first was that while strong tests to detect fabrication had
been developed in psychiatric spheres, such an occurrence was
in fact rare. 5 9 The second was to seek an estimate from British
insurers as to the likely increase in premiums if such claims were
allowed in the negligence field.3 6 ° The response was only up to
a ten percent increase. 361 Such contentions seem to place the
floodgates fear in a better grounded context.
H. A SYSTEMATIZATION OF SYMPTOMS, SIGNS, AND DIAGNOSES-
IN A NEW CONTEXT
1. Differentiation of Causation Based on Symptom Evidence
A synthesis of the current position regarding compensation
for injuries resulting from aviation accidents has been under-
taken. It is important that a systematization be undertaken
given the loose terminology referred to above. In the argument
above, a firm differentiation between symptoms, signs, and diag-
noses has been given. It is submitted that courts have been mis-
guided in that they have concentrated on psychiatric symptoms,
rather than attempting to grapple with the greater complexity of
psychiatric diagnosis and pathology.
Typical symptoms and signs of course are as many and as wide
as medicine itself, but the following lists indicate a small selec-
tion which illustrates the following argument.
Typical physical symptoms of physical illness might include:
1. swelling;
2. colour change;





357 See Post Traumatic Stress, supra note 346.
358 LAW COMM'N, supra note 323, at 5, 55.
359 Id. at 53.
36 Id. at 7.
361 Id,
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While typical psychiatric symptoms and signs include:
1. tiredness and/or asthenia;
2. hallucinations;
3. mood changes;
4. changes in concentration; and
5. changes in higher mental functions
It is important to note that none of these symptoms can be re-
garded as exclusively physical or exclusively psychiatric. There
are physical illnesses that have psychiatric symptoms, and psychi-
atric illnesses that may present with physical symptoms. For ex-
ample, asthenia may be seen in much physical illness-cardiac
failure, chronic airways disease, hormonal, and autoimmune ill-
nesses. Hallucinations often occur in any illness that is coupled
with low oxygen levels, such as cardiac failure and respiratory
disease. Mood changes are often associated with hormonal ill-
ness and also strikingly with carcinomatosis. On the other hand,
pain can be very difficult to distinguish in terms of physical ele-
ments and psychogenic elements. Tremor may occur in anxiety.
Arrythmiae may be seen in depression and anxiety.
Further, it is important to note that consideration of the
symptom alone is insufficient to determine the cause of a disor-
der, and an attempt must be made to delve to the diagnosis level
in order to appreciate the full science of the disorder. If one
takes a group of symptoms alone and attempts to assign a cause
to them, it is clearly a task fraught with error, if not an impossi-
ble task. Thus, any attempt to examine psychiatric symptoms
alone, i.e., the manifestations of a disease, leads one to error.
Courts may well have fallen into this error. Reliance on exami-
nation and the elucidation of signs alone is similarly fraught. It
is often not until investigations are carried out that a firmer
cause can be assigned, and the examination of the underlying
pathology reveals the true nature of a condition and its physical-
ity. But even then, the diagnostic process allows only the assign-
ment of probability rather than establishment of certainty. It
has been indicated above that our ability in more subtle cases
depends very much on the degree of advancement of investiga-
tive techniques.
2. A Systematization
From the point of view of aviation accidents, individuals may
present psychiatric symptoms, physical symptoms, or both. The
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difficulty of separating these has been argued on several
grounds.
For review purposes, the following table gives various alterna-
tive presentations versus diagnoses. It is emphasized that where
concentration on symptoms and signs have been the norm in
the past, thinking must move beyond these to diagnoses.
Presentation Clusters
Symptoms-said to be Symptoms-said to be
Physical Psychiatric
Diagnosis Physical - A B
Diagnosis Psychiatric - C D
This is now examined in the context of aviation accident
jurisprudence.
A litigant will succeed at once, on current jurisprudence, if it
can be shown that there is a physical basis for the symptoms
claimed, and that this physical basis has been induced by the
accident concerned. 62 While this may be an improper mode of
argument, viz. that the symptom rather than the disease has a
defined basis, it is accepted that existing jurisprudence points to
success. Thus, injuries manifesting with either physical or psychi-
atric symptoms traceable to a physical cause will succeed as hav-
ing a definite physical basis for the underlying diagnoses. These
are accounted for in areas A and B above.
Area C is enigmatic. The possibility for psychiatric disease
presenting with physical symptoms is extremely common. A
substantial example is provided by the group of conversion hys-
terias, so called, where individuals will manifest severe physical
disability (such as paralysis, inability to speak, and blindness) de-
riving from psychiatric illness. Although not tested, one feels
that a definite physical consequence is readily demonstrated,
and so litigation may potentially succeed. Area C, therefore, is
probably one that need not concern us further. The only area
which is currently rejected, without argument, is the set of psy-
chiatric diagnoses presenting with psychiatric symptoms, and
these are represented in area D above. It is to area D that our
attention is drawn.
362 See El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175-76 (1998); E. Air-
lines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991); King v. Bristow Helicopters Ltd.,
[2002] 2 A.C. 628 (H.L.), 17.
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3. "The Area D Debate"
Area D has forced various litigants into a somewhat artificial
endeavor, that is to show that the claimed symptoms have a defi-
nite physical basis. The debate over the inappropriateness of
this has been given above.
Concerns regarding opening floodgates by allowing area D
claims to be argued, and potentially to succeed, have been a ma-
jor concern of those suggesting that these injuries should re-
main disallowed. It has already been argued that expert opinion
of causation, relation to the accident, and degree of disability
engendered ought to be required. 63 It has been argued that
other areas of the law have been able to grapple with the flood-
gates and the concerns have been containable and appropriately
contained. 364 Floodgates have not been necessarily opened and
the concern has been relatively unfounded. The view of the
U.K_ Law Commission is presented above.365
But more particularly, it has been shown that it is intrinsically
untenable to separate physical and psychiatric injury, and that it
is likely, when investigative modalities are fine enough, that all
maladies will be shown to have some form of physical basis. 366
Ultimately, given a biological viewpoint, some level of neuronal
connection abnormality or neurotransmitter abnormality is
likely to be demonstrated as the basis for psychiatric symptoma-
tology. It is likely that environmental causes, such as that pro-
vided by an accident, will be shown to influence neuronal action
and communication, and thus, causation is likely to be demon-
strated. Examples of various syndromes have been given above.
I. ACHIEVING A JUST WIDENING OF INTERPRETATION
The process of determining a claim involves certain notional
processes on the part of a court. The claim of the plaintiff is
tested ultimately against the conventions governing air accident
compensation. For dualist legal regimes, this involves determin-
ing a cause against the legislation that enacts the adoption of
the conventions. Widening the extent of compensability in or-
der to allow claims for proven psychiatric injury can take place
at one of several levels.
363 See discussion supra Part III.F.
364 Robert Rabin, Emotional Distress in Tort Law: Themes of Constraint, 44 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 1197, 1198-1202 (2004).
365 See discussion supra Part III.E.1.
366 HANDBOOK, supra note 341, at 5-6.
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At the root of the problem has been the assignment of mean-
ing to "lesion corporelle," and in particular the debate as to
whether this includes mental injury. Conventions may be al-
tered to make the intention clear if there is ambiguity or obscu-
rity.367 Doing so is dependent on the will of the drafters of
conventions, including the negotiations transacted at diplomatic
conferences establishing them. For example, it is entirely inade-
quate for drafters to say that psychiatric injury should be-or
is-included, and then do nothing in the face of a demon-
strated claimed ambiguity causing judicial debate. Convention
writers cannot maintain integrity by acknowledging one view
and then remaining inactive. Given that many consider that "l-
sion corporelle" already includes mental injury, yet note the fail-
ure of courts to act in accord with these views, there would seem
little excuse for not explicitly removing ambiguity. Such was the
desire of a number of delegates at the commencement of the
Montreal Diplomatic Conference in May, 1999.368 However, for
whatever reason (the cynical may take one view where others
may be milder) the opportunity was lost. Nase, in discussing the
lost opportunity presented at Montreal, refers to compensation
for mental injury as "the issue that will not go away." '369 Perhaps
it is the case that this issue can only "go away" when just compen-
sation is allowable, departing from the narrow view so far
adopted. If the international legal system, in a sense led by
IATA carriers and ICAO, were to take the initiative, a new ap-
proach might quickly be settled based around unilateral waiver
of defenses. The ideal for revision of the convention would, of
course, involve states in agreeing to a modification of the War-
saw and Montreal Conventions. This is the ideal but, sadly, least
likely method for effecting the necessary change.
However, further avenues are available. Legislators adopting
a particular convention may well enhance the required defini-
tions so that in a particular jurisdiction legislation leaves no
doubt that the wider approach is "permissible." There are, how-
ever, consequent implications for the locale for the bringing of
a case.
367 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 31, art. 32 (supple-
mentary means of interpretation).
368 Montreal Convention of 1999, supra note 2, art. 17.
369 Nicholas Humphrey & Vernon Nase, Three Steps Forward, Two Steps Back: Re-
flections on Air Carriers' Liability and Australia's Accession to Montreal, ZLW 55, 3/
2006, at 376.
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While these mechanisms are "ideal world" approaches, in the
present real climate perhaps the only path available is a judi-
cially activist route, despite the controversy attaching to that
term.
Judicial determinations may be made interpreting given
adopting legislation, and this is the generation process for the
common law. It is indicative that adopting legislation has not
adequately solved the problem when courts take recourse to the
original convention to interpret phrases like "lesion corporelle."
Courts have also dabbled in the veracity of the translation as
"bodily injury" having recourse to the original conventions. y°
The ultimate result has been a strictly literal interpretation. 71
Given the passage of time since the jurisprudence became en-
trenched, and the advances in legal and medical thinking, it
may well require forward thinking activist judges to drag the
conventions, kicking and screaming, into modernity.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This article has argued that it is long overdue for the scope of
compensation for aviation accident induced injury to be wid-
ened to include pure psychiatric injury. In order to succeed in
the currently accepted jurisprudential climate, a plaintiff, with
what may be regarded as pure psychiatric injury, must argue for
a definite physical base to the injury. This is artificial and lim-
ited by current technology, not justice.
Contemporary medical thinking is that there is no fundamen-
tal difference between psychiatric illness and physical illness
processes. Both inform the other. Thus, on fundamental
grounds, widening of the concept of injury necessarily suggests
that psychiatric injury is simply a frailty to which all flesh is sub-
ject and should be considered in no different way from physical
injury.
Secondly, however, if one accepts for argument sake that a
physical basis for psychiatric injury is necessary for success,
much biological evidence is amassing indicating that the vast
majority of, if not all, mental illness has a physical basis. The
discovery of such a basis eludes us in some cases only by dint of
the inadequacy of available investigative technology.
Routes to making the matter contemporary include explicit
framing of various conventions and explicit statements in ena-
3170 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 536-44 (1991).
371 Id. at 542.
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bling and adopting legislation. However, in the short term, it
may fall to an activist judiciary to demonstrate that the law does
not lag and limp behind contemporary thinking. Such pressure
may well induce legislators, and framers of conventions, to
adopt what otherwise might be considered "courageous."
At the conclusion of the Diplomatic Conference in 1999, de-
fendant lawyers felt they had cause to celebrate the survival of
the words "bodily injury," minus a tentatively proposed "and
mental injury," in the authentic English language text of the
new Montreal Convention.72 However, obiter dicta at the House
of Lords level in King v. Bristow Helicopters has brought the sup-
position that mental injury is excluded from the new convention
into considerable doubt.373 In particular, Lord Steyn cited the
Master of the Rolls in Morris v. KLM, who observed:
If and when the 1999 Montreal Convention comes into force
there may be scope for argument, on the basis of the travaux
prparatoires evidencing the consideration that was given to
mental injury, that those who drafted the Convention intended
the meaning of the phrase "bodily injury" to turn on the jurispru-
dence of the individual state applying that Convention. 7 4
The statement in question, which was adopted by the Mon-
treal Diplomatic Conference in plenary session on the second
last day of the Conference, provides ample support for a mod-
ern interpretation of the words bodily injury in applying the
Montreal Convention. Given that the Montreal Convention is a
consolidating convention that is intended to refine and improve
the Warsaw Convention in its various manifestations, and that it
currently applies in the European Union and the United States,
the door is not merely ajar, it is nearly open. The relevant inclu-
sion reads:
With reference to Article 16, paragraph 1 of the Convention, the
expression "bodily injury" is included on the basis of the fact that
in some States damages for mental injuries are recoverable
under certain circumstances, that jurisprudence in this area is
developing and that it is not intended to interfere with this devel-
opment, having regard to jurisprudence in areas other than in-
ternational carriage by air[.]T 75
372 Montreal Convention of 1999, supra note 2, art. 17.
373 King v. Bristow Helicopters Ltd., [2002] 2 A.C. 623 (H.L.), 31.
374 Id.
375 ICAO, International Conference on Air Law, Montreal, Can., May 10-28,
1999, Minutes, at 243, ICAO Doc. 9775-DC/2 (2001).
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The explicit acknowledgement by the conference in its travaux
prgparatoires of developing jurisprudence provides a platform
upon which a modern interpretation of what constitutes bodily
injury might be made. On the basis of the obiter dicta in King,
and, because of the modern meaning of the word "bodily" and
the state of medical knowledge in 1999 and at the present day-
making it possible to measure bodily changes with greater accu-
racy than ever before-the writers argue that it is time for a se-
nior court in Anglo-American jurisdictions to provide recovery
for pure mental injury in international aviation accidents. It
should do so on the basis of sound evidence in support of bodily
changes.
In conclusion, Lord Hope in King v. Bristow Helicopters offered
a perspicacious view toward the future:
It has for a long time been recognised that it is not possible to
maintain a rigid distinction between the body and the mind in
the law relating to liability in damages for negligence. In Bourhill
v. Young [1943] AC 92, 103[,] Lord Macmillan recognised that
the crude view that the law should take cognisance only of physi-
cal injury resulting from actual impact had been discarded and
that it was recognised that an action will lie for injury by shock
sustained without direct contact. As he put it, the distinction be-
tween mental shock and bodily injury was never a scientific
one.
376
376 King, 2 A.C. at 47.
0Lal. 0.-~
